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ABSTRACT 
 
Stakeholder banking is an umbrella terms that is used to describe cooperative and savings 
banks. They differ from other commercial mainly through their ownership form, as they 
are owned by their customers. Because of this unique characteristic stakeholder banks are 
not able to use the capital markets to fund their business. Furthermore, they are often 
considered to run their business with a focus on stakeholder surplus maximization rather 
than pure profit maximization. These factors highly affect their business model, business 
capitalization, and risk taking. Owners, with their simultaneous role as customers, are 
reluctant to allow the bank to take risky positions in their operations with the fear of losing 
their savings. 
 
This thesis focuses on how stakeholder banks differ from their shareholder bank 
counterparts in the Nordic countries during and after the period of the most recent 
financial crisis. The effect of being a stakeholder bank, as well as differences in the micro- 
and macroeconomic performance determinants of the two groups, is examined through 
three performance variables: profitability, cost efficiency, and loan quality. This study 
finds stakeholder banks to be more profitable and cost efficient than shareholder banks 
during the crisis, as well as having better quality loans in the post-crisis period. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Stakeholder Banking, Bank Performance, Financial Crisis
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the ownership structure of Nordic banks has 
had an effect on their performance during the most recent financial crisis, as well as the 
subsequent period after it. The prupose is to find whether stakeholder banks performed 
better than shareholder banks during and after the recent financial crisis. The performance 
of banks will be measured by three different criteria: profitability, cost efficiency, and 
loan quality. The thesis will also highlight the specific determinants behind the possible 
differences found between ownership types, shedding further light onto the differences 
between Nordic stakeholder and shareholder banks. 
 
Banks are in the epicenter of money markets that allow the constant flow of monetary 
resources internationally between both companies and individuals. While for the most 
part this model of a global financial system can be seen as a positive phenomenon for the 
global markets, it also has its downsides. The interconnected markets were a major reason 
for the magnitude of the financial crisis that started in 2008. Consequently, many banks 
suffered great losses during the period of the financial crisis. However, some banks 
seemed to outperform others. Previous research has shown that certain characteristics, 
such as a higher capital ratio or non-interest income rate, have helped banks to endure the 
downturn in the economy. Banks that were more profitable before a crisis, and thus very 
likely carrying more risk, performed badly during the crisis period (Dietrich & 
Wanzenried 2011; Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier & Stulz 2012). Also, banks with specific 
ownership types were found to act countercyclically, thus being able to perform better 
during the crisis compared to its contemporaries (Ferri, Kalmi & Kerola 2014).  
 
The European banking sector can be classified through examining the ownership structure 
of banks. Privately owned stock banks, mutual banks, and government-owned banks all 
have different characteristics and qualities due to the differences in their ownership 
structure, even though they all utilize a similar principal model of banking (Iannotta, 
Nocera & Sironi 2007: 21-28). In their paper regarding bank ownership structures and 
their effects on bank profitability, Stakeholder banks differ from shareholder banks due 
to the fact that they decrease their loan supply to a lesser extent than shareholder banks 
during financial contractions. Stakeholder banks and shareholder banks can be seen to 
have different objectives, as shareholder banks concentrate on maximizing profits for 
their shareholders, while stakeholder banks are focused on relationship-based banking 
and creating consumer surplus for all their stakeholders. In this context, the list of 
stakeholders a bank might have can include for example shareholders, customers, 
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employees, borrowers, depositors, communities and government.  (Ferri et. al. 2014; 
Jensen 2010.) 
 
Cooperative banks, which are considered as a type of stakeholder bank, are 
geographically important for socially committed businesses on a local level. Owners of 
cooperative banks are often simultaneously also customers of the bank, and are thus 
referred to as members of the bank. The owners or members are not able to increase their 
voting power by purchasing more shares. Therefore, cooperative banks often provide 
their customers with other means of profiting from the partnership, such as providing 
them with additional products and services, as well as competitive pricing. They are also 
seen as important vessels in transfering the effects of monetary policies all the way down 
to local economies and their benefactors. As such, the role stakeholder banks play in 
easing the negative effects of financial crises and implementing essential policies is vital 
to the economic landscape during economic downturns. (Fiordelisi & Mare 2014.) 
 
During the past few decades, the prevalent trend in the Nordic banking sector has been 
the digitalization of banking services provided to customers. This progression has resulted 
in the drastic decline in the amount of branch offices, as well as the number of people 
employed by the banking sector. The changing competitive landscape has been a 
challenge especially for stakeholder banks, as they often provide regionally focused 
banking services, and are recognized as parts of the local communities. Conversely, 
stakeholder banks utilize their regionality to their advantage by creating long-lasting 
customer relationships, which benefit both the bank and its customers.  Because of the 
way the banking sector is shaping up to be in the future, stakeholder banks in particular 
have had to adjust and renew their banking operations in order to keep up with the rest of 
the field. 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The main purpose of this study is to find out whether Nordic stakeholder banks were able 
to outperform Nordic shareholder banks during the time period of the financial crisis or 
not and if so, whether they have been able to maintain that advantage after the financial 
crisis. Because stakeholder banks do not focus solely on profit maximization, it is 
justifiable to measure performance with more diversified metrics than just bank 
profitability. Thus, bank performance will be measured by three different metrics: 
profitability, cost efficiency, and loan quality. Additionally, the determinants of 
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stakeholder bank performance are investigated both during and after the financial crisis 
in order to determine whether the drivers behind stakeholder bank performance have 
significantly changed depending on the prevailing economic conditions. 
 
The reasoning for the specifics of this study is that, while different ownership types and 
characteristics of European banks have been largely studied in the past, most of the 
research has focused on either countries with high concentrations of stakeholder banks 
compared to the entire population of banks, or a wide sample of European countries where 
different forms of stakeholder banking are encountered. While both of these constraint 
have their own advantages, they also have their shortcomings. In most of the literature, 
stakeholder banks are found to be very heterogeneic, with their traits and configurations 
depending on their specific environment. In this context, the Nordic banking sector is yet 
to be more rigorously studied. Furthermore, the research on bank performance after the 
financial crisis still remains limited, as the final ripples of the crisis faded out just a couple 
of years ago, making the collection of an adequate amount of data from the post-crisis 
period impossible until recently. 
 
 
1.2. Structure of the study 
 
This study continues followingly. After this introduction, the theoretical background of 
the banking sector is discussed. Special attention is paid to stakeholder banking and its 
different forms, banking risks and how stakeholder banks may approach them differently, 
as well as the personality traits of the Nordic banking sector and how it differs from other 
banking clusters around the world. In the second chapter, financial crises and their origins 
are discussed, with specific focus on the most recent financial crisis and its effects on the 
Scandinavian banking sector. 
 
The third part goes through previous subject conducted on the subject of how different 
bank ownership types affect their decision-making, performance metrics, as well as their 
place in society. The data and methodology chapter first discusses how banks are valued 
in a theoretical framework, as well as how their performance can be measured. The data 
used in the study will be gone through, and specifications and expectations will be given 
to all the variables that are presented. The methodology will be presented, as well as the 
reasoning behind it. 
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The empirical research chapter first presents a table of the descriptive statistics for the 
used variables, as well as a correlation matrix for them. After that, the results derived 
from the regressions that were run are presented and analyzed in terms of Nordic 
stakeholder bank performance and its determinants during and after the financial crisis, 
and how they differ from those of Nordic shareholder banks. Finally, this paper provides 
conclusions that can be drawn from the regression results, as well as suggestions for 
further lines of research regarding this topic.  
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2. THE BANKING SECTOR 
 
Banks can be described as financial intermediaries who offer their clients deposits, loans 
and other payment services. This chapter discusses the banking sector and its role in 
modern society. Topics that will be discussed are financial intermediation, stakeholder 
banking and how it differs from shareholder banking, as well as the risks involved in 
common banking practices and how the risk minimization strategies of stakeholder banks 
differ from those of commercial banks. The Nordic banking sector and its unique traits 
compared to other global banking clusters are also presented. 
 
 
2.1. Banks as financial intermediaries 
 
One of the most important tasks the banking industry has had for all its existence has been 
the allocation of surplus funds to those with deficit funds. Both groups can include 
households, companies, foreign investments, government funds, and other financial 
institutions. This could be done without the involvement of banks, but it would be highly 
inefficient because of the differing requirements each side might have. This is believed 
to be the main reason banks have come to existence in the first place. (Casu, Girardone 
& Molyneux 2015: 3-19.) 
 
Banks have three clear main functions in the intermediation process. First, the amount of 
money a depositor is willing to lend and how much a borrower asks for are usually very 
far apart. Loan sizes are typically much larger than the normal balance of a savings 
account. The same also holds true for the maturity of deposits and loans. Depositors are 
willing to lend money for only short periods of time, whereas lenders demand longer loan 
periods. Banks are able to combine multiple deposits, package them together and hand 
them out as larger sized loans. This function is called asset pooling. The bank is also able 
to address the problem of maturity by ‘mismatching’, or enabling short-term deposits and 
using them to finance medium and long term loans. (Casu et. al. 2015: 3-19.) 
 
The final function is minimizing a borrower’s credit risk, meaning the risk that a borrower 
might default. In order to minimize their credit risks, banks diversify investments, pool 
risks, screen and monitor loan takers and hold capital reserves in case of sudden losses. 
Combined, these three factors decrease loan costs and boost deposit earnings, making the 
use of financial intermediation beneficial for all parties involved.  (Casu et. al. 2015: 3-
19.) 
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2.2. Banking balance sheets and income statements 
 
The balance sheet of a bank reveals how it has amassed its funds and how it has used 
them in the financial market. The most important sources for funds are individual deposits 
from both people and businesses, and also loan taking from other financial institutions 
and the financial markets. A bank uses its funds, also known as its liabilities, to hand out 
loans to customers, buy marketable securities, and keep money reserves. These are called 
the assets of a bank, and they are used to make profit by demanding an interest rate on 
loans and securities they own that is higher than the interest rate and other costs the bank 
has to pay for its liabilities. (Cecchetti 2008: 272-300; Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 439-455.) 
 
The assets of a bank consist of four main categories: cash items, securities, loans and 
other assets. Cash assets are further divided into three subcategories: cash reserves, which 
are mandated via regulations for a bank to hold, ‘cash items in process of collection’, 
meaning deposits that the bank is certain to obtain in the future, and the balances banks 
possess in other banks, which is more common for smaller banks. Cash reserves are the 
most liquid form of assets, and it includes the deposits a bank has in its vaults and in a 
central bank. Banks aim to minimize their cash reserves since cash can be funneled to 
more profitable assets. Securities show how much stocks and bonds a bank owns. 
Securities are mostly liquid, and they are often called the secondary reserves. Loans are 
the most important type of assets a bank owns, and on average they make up almost two-
thirds of all bank assets. Different types of loans can be roughly divided into different 
categories: commercial and industrial loans, or C&I loans, real estate loans, consumer 
loans, interbank loans and other loans. Depending on the type of loan, their liquidity can 
vary significantly. For example, mortgages and consumer loans can easily be securitized 
and sold forward, whereas some business loans can be extremely hard to sell. Other assets 
cover assets like equipment and buildings, but also reposessed collateral from defaulted 
borrowers. (Cecchetti 2008: 272-300; Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 439-455.) 
 
Liabilities tell how banks finance their operations. It can be split into checkable deposits, 
nontransaction deposits, borrowings and bank capital. Checkable deposits means 
borrower accounts from which money can be withdrawn instantaneously if the borrower 
so chooses. Its importance as a means of funding for banks has declined in recent years 
due to its low interest rates and new, more intriguing instruments. Nontransaction deposits 
grant the borrower bigger interest rates, but they also have more restrictions than 
checkable deposits. Most common types of non-transaction deposits are savings accounts 
and time accounts. Borrowings state the different loans a bank has from other banks, 
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financial institutions and central banks. These loans can be overnight loans, repurchase 
agreements or standard loans. Bank capital is the same as a bank’s net worth. It consists 
of the bank’s previously retained earnings and raised equity. Bank capital acts as a 
cushion against possible loan defaults. (Casu et. al. 2015: 260-274; Cecchetti 2008: 272-
300; Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 439-455.) Figure 1 provides a simplified version of a bank’s 
balance sheet. 
 
Figure 1. Simplified commercial bank balance sheet. (Casu, Girardone & Molyneux 2015: 271.) 
 
 
Some of the businesses a bank undergoes are not shown on its balance sheet. These so-
called off-balance sheet activities (OBS) are a way to increase a bank’s profitability and 
capital structure through fee incomes. The main forms of OBS activities are loan 
commitments, loan sales, financial guarantees and securities underwriting.  A bank may 
grant a loan commitment to a company, in which case the company is able to loan money 
from the bank up to a set amount during a set amount of time for a specific investment. 
The company pays a fee for this pledge, and it can choose to use all, some or none of the 
guaranteed money during this time. In a loan sale, a bank forwards a loan to a third party, 
thus erasing it from the bank’s balance sheet. The interest paid to the third party is slightly 
lower than the original interest on the loan, making it profitable for the bank. Financial 
guarantees, such as letters of credit, are ways for a bank to ensure a company’s credit 
standing. They are used to promise a third party that a company it is dealing with will 
repay its debts. If the company defaults, the bank is responsible for paying the third party. 
These guarantees aim to reduce asymmetric information between two businesses. (Casu 
et. al. 2015: 303-310; Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 454-455.) OBS-activities have been 
scrutinized recently due to their high risks, but they have also proven to be a source of 
high risk-adjusted profits in modern banking (Cecchetti 2008: 283; Lozano-vivas & 
Pasiouras 2014: 1436-1437). 
 
In general, bank income statements show how they have accumulated their income as 
well as their expenses. Along with the information from the balance sheet, it can be used 
Assets Liabilities
Cash Deposits: retail
Liquid Assets Deposits: wholesale
Loans
Other investments Equity
Fixed Assets Other capital terms
Total assets Total liabilities and equity
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to evaluate how well a bank is performing. Banks generate income mainly through either 
interest generating income or non-interest generating income. Interest income includes 
income from loans and investments, while non-interest income mainly consists of fees 
and commisions from other forms of banking services the bank might provide. Interest 
income can be thought to be a more traditional form of income for banks, while non-
interest income is usually associated with more modern or exotic banking services. 
Typically, stakeholder banks are thought to operate more on the traditional side of 
banking. Their smaller size make them more dependent on the income generated through 
term transformation, where short-term deposits from customers are turned into long-term 
loans. (Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993; Memmel 2011.) 
 
The operating expenses of a bank usually arise from its current operations. Expenses can 
be divided in two based on whether or not they are interest or non-interest expenses. 
Interest expenses include payments to customers for their deposits in the bank. Non-
interest expenses contain the typical costs that arise from running any sort of business, 
such as salaries for employees, rents on premises, or purchases for equipment. (Mishkin 
& Eakins 2012: 457-459.) Table 2 presents a simplified version of a commercial banks 
income statement. 
 
Figure 2. A simplified bank income statement. (Casu, Girardone & Molyneux 2015: 280.) 
A Interest income
B Interest expenses
C (= A - B) Net interest income (or spread)
D Loan loss provisions (LLP)
E (= C - D) Net interest income after LLP
F Non-interest income
G Non-interest expense
H (= F - G) Net non-interest income
I (= E + H) Pre-tax net operating profit
L Securities gains (losses)
M (= I + L) Profits before taxes
N Taxes
O Extraordinary items
P (= M - N - O) Net profit
Q Cash dividends
R (= P - Q) Retained profit
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2.3. Stakeholder banking 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to differentiate between the different bank 
ownership types that are prevalent in the European banking sector. The four main bank 
ownership types are public (or government-owned) banks,  commercial (or shareholder) 
banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks. Due to similarities in their ownership form 
as well as their organizational objectives, the last two ownership types can be merged 
together to compose a group called stakeholder banks. The characteristics of these types 
of banks will be discussed in this chapter.  
 
Stakeholder banking, also referred to in some literary reviews as mutual banking, differs 
from commercial banking in that the banks in the group are mutually owned by their 
members. Every member of a stakeholder bank holds equal voting rights concerning the 
corporate governance of the bank, meaning that no entity has more power over another 
concerning its decision making. This ownership entitlement cannot be sold or transferred 
forward to any third party member. Due to the dispersion of ownership and decision-
making, stakeholder banks typically defer these responsibilities to their board members. 
Unlike ownership of shareholder banks, stakeholder banks do not pay dividends on their 
accumulated profits, but rather use their retained earnings to reinvest in the business. This 
is understandable, since stakeholder banks are unable to raise money from the capital 
markets. This also entails that, since ownership rights or capital cannot be traded 
externally, stakeholder banks face little to no market discipline compared to their 
shareholder contemporaries. (Goddard, McKillop & Wilson 2016: 103-108.) 
 
The difference in the ownership model also affects the business model of stakeholder 
banks compared to shareholder banks; instead of focusing on simply maximizing 
shareholder value (i.e. their profitability), stakeholder banks aim to maximize the surplus 
of their stakeholders. The list of different stakeholders may include (but are not limited 
to) some or all of the following main groups: shareholders, customers, employees, local 
communities, and government (Jensen 2010). As the owners of stakeholder banks are 
typically also its customers, they are more inclined to detained from any risky business 
ventures, and instead focus on more traditional forms of banking activities. This effect is 
amplified by the fact that individual owners have little chances to affect the bank’s 
behaviour, and also because management cannot be incentivized towards risky 
investments, since their bonuses cannot be linked to shareholder value. (Goddard et. al. 
2016: 103-108.) 
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Members of savings banks mutually are their mutual owners at the same time. Generally, 
members are also depositors or savers in the banks they own at the same time. The 
business endeavours of savings banks are often associated with the socio-economic 
development of the local area in which they operate. Due to this regional focus, savings 
banks do not tend to directly compete with each other. Savings banks have been 
historically regarded as public banks, with ownership being held at least partly by a 
government entity. In recent years, many countries have witnessed the privatization of 
savings banks. According to Ferri, Kalmi, and Kerola (2014), savings banks have three 
distinctive features, regardless of any possible differences in business model and structure 
of ownership: they are not-for-profit financial institutions, and they (or the entities 
owning them) have a social mission. They can also be decentralized pieces of a larger 
network of banks. (Goddard et. al. 2016.: 114-116) 
 
Similar to savings banks, cooperative banks are also mutually owned by entities that most 
often can also be considered as customers of the banks. Their membership may sometimes 
be highly dispersed, while some cooperative banks have a very localized ownership. They 
are focused on offering retail and banking services to small and medium-sized businesses. 
Cooperative banking is based on three essential principles that shape its structure: first, 
they are self-governed by their members, who also provide the banks their equity. Second, 
the banks primary customers are its members. Third, every member has only one vote, 
regardless of the number of bank shares a member might have. Like savings banks,  
regional cooperative banks are usually part of larger networks of a cooperative 
organization. The purest form of cooperative banks are credit unions, where all customers 
are demanded to be members of the credit union at the same time. However, these types 
of cooperative banks are not found in Nordic countries. (Goddard et. al. 2016: 118-124.) 
 
 
2.4. Banking related risks 
 
Like any other win-seeking financial organization, a commercial bank’s goal is to 
maximize company value for its shareholders. The same holds also true with stakeholder 
banks, but to a lesser extent. Their strive for profitability is mainly driven by their primary 
objective of stakeholder value maximization. In modern global markets, finding high 
returns for safe investments is getting increasingly hard. Furthermore, due to the nature 
of their value creation, banks are inherently more leveraged than normal privately owned 
companies. Thus, banks must be able to maximize its profits, all the while keeping its 
aggregate risk in check. (Cecchetti 2008: 284.) This chapter discusses the different types 
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of risks banks face, how they aim to manage it, and how stakeholder banks possibly differ 
from shareholder banks in their way of preventing these risks. It should be noted that, 
though being presented separately, these risks usually correlate between one another, 
rather than occuring independently (Casu et. al. 2015: 349-350). 
 
2.4.1. Credit risk 
 
Credit risk is the most common type of risk linked with banking. Because of its 
connection to the fundamentals of financial intermediation, credit risk has historically 
been a very important risk for banks to control. It is characterized as the possibility that a 
borrower is unable to handle its loan obligations to the bank. This in turn implies decline 
in the client’s credit standing. However, this decline doesn’t directly suggest default, but 
rather an increased possibility of default. Credit risk isn’t limited to the clients of a bank; 
it can be a result of holding bonds, guarantees, derivatives or other securities that 
experience a drop in their credit standing. This can happen if for example a credit-rating 
agency lowers the credit rating of a security. (Casu et. al. 2015: 329-332; Cecchetti 2008: 
287-288; Choudry 2012: 40-41.) 
 
A basic way for banks to manage their credit risk is by diversifying their loan portfolio 
so that they offer a large variety of loans. This means spreading their loans both 
geographically and across different industries, protecting itself from local or industry-
specific economic declines. This can however conflict with the value creation of a bank: 
it would be much easier to gather information and achieve a competitive edge over a 
specific niche. Loan portofolios should also be diversified to match the amount of risk 
banks are willing to hold. (Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 609-613.) 
 
Banks use credit risk analysis to figure out a possible borrower’s credit risk. This means 
looking at possible problems with previous loans, as well as gathering personal 
information. Using the analysis data a bank is then able to approximate the default risk of 
a specific borrower. Loans are then granted or denied in relation to the amount of default 
risk the bank wants to hold. Borrowers are also monitored afterwards in order to detect 
unwanted behaviour like moral hazard. It is important to remember that higher default 
risk means higher interest rates, which in turn enables bigger return potential for the bank. 
How much risk a bank is willing to endure varies greatly between institutions, and is 
determined by bank-specific loan policies. (Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 609-613.) 
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The nature of stakeholder banks make them both more equipped to dealing with, but also 
more susceptible to the dangers of credit risk. Since stakeholder banks are typically 
geographically centered, their customer base is also limited because of this. Stakeholder 
banks are often regarded as local operatives within the community, which in turn results 
in long customer relationships between the local people and businesses and the banks. 
This allows stakeholder banks to gather more soft information on their clients over a 
longer period of time than commercial banks, providing them with more knowledge about 
their customers compared to their contemporaries and giving them a competitive 
advantage on the segment in question. Conversely, this geographical concentration can 
also increase credit risk, since banks are more reluctant to do business outside the are 
which they consider their own comfort zone, thus limiting the possibility of 
geographically diversifying their loan portfolios. (Boot & Thakor 2000; Ferri et. al. 2014.) 
 
2.4.2. Liquidity risk 
 
Liquidity risk arises from the way banks fund their operations through customer deposits. 
Most of these lenders can demand the bank to pay them their deposits in cash anytime 
they like. To be able to manage these sudden requests banks hold a partial amount of its 
assets as cash reserves. If, however, the lenders would demand payment on their deposits 
simultaneously, the bank’s cash reserves would most likely not cover every depositor. 
One reason for the banks’ inability to pay is the mismatching they undergo when 
combining deposits and loans of different size and maturity. And while the assets of the 
depositors are liquid, most of the loans banks hold are not and they cannot be liquidated 
easily. What makes liquidity risk even more hazardous is its way of being self-
perpetuating in worst cases; a bank not being able to pay its lenders their deposits creates 
distrust. This in turn causes people to fear for the safety of their deposits and wanting to 
cash in immediately. This so-called “bank run” worsens the bank’s financial situation and 
in worst cases might cause insolvency or bankruptcy. (Casu et. al. 2015: 336-338; 
Cecchetti 2008: 284-287.) 
 
When managing liquidity risk it is important to differentiate between day-to-day liquidity 
risk and a liquidity crisis. Day-to-day liquidity risk is the average amount of deposits 
withdrawn daily drom a bank. This is usually easily managed by the bank, since only a 
small portion of deposits are usually cashed out, and the amount doesn’t vary much on a 
daily basis. Liquidity crisis refers to a situation where these normal amounts are 
surpassed. These events are highly unpredictable and are caused by situations described 
in the previous paragraph. Banks can prepare for such events either by holding more cash 
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reserves or other easily marketable assets like treasury bills or other government 
securities, or by financing their operations by long-period liabilities. However, this is 
problematic because cash reserves yield little to no profit and longer loan periods are 
more costly. The bank has to decide how much cost inefficiency they are willing to 
withstand compared to their liquidity risk. Banks can also use different types of analysis 
methods to establish their needs for liquidity. These methods include the loan/deposits -
ratio and short-term securities to total deposits. (Casu et. al. 2015: 336-339.) 
 
 
2.4.3. Interest rate risk 
 
Interest rate risk derives from the fact that banks receive and pay interest on their assets 
and liabilities, respectively. The interest rate of these securities can be either fixed to a 
specific interest rate, or it can be re-priced in a certain time period, making it interest-rate 
sensitive. Due to the mismatching of assets and liabilities the different rates on assets and 
liabilities are unbalanced. This causes banks to be susceptible to possible interest rate 
alterations in the future. If for example a bank has more interest rate sensitive liabilities 
than assets, which is often true due to the length of loans compared to deposits, a rise in 
interest rates most likely decreases banks’ net interest margin, and vice-versa. Interest 
rate risk can be further divided into refinancing risk and reinvestment risk. Refinancing 
risk refers to a situation where the maturity of a bank’s assets is longer than the maturity 
of its liabilities, so it has to refinance its assets more often. This exposes the bank to 
unexpected interest rate changes. The same holds inversely true for reinvestment risk; if 
a bank has longer-maturity liabilities than assets, it runs the risk of reinvesting its assets 
at a lower interest rate than before. (Casu et. al. 2015: 332-336; Cecchetti 2008: 288-291.) 
 
The traditional way for a bank to measure interest rate is gap analysis. It compares the 
amount of interest rate sensitive assets and liabilities a bank holds, giving a crude ratio 
that tells how much the net interest margin (or NIM) of the bank changes in relation to a 
change in interest rates. Banks have several different ways of managing interest rate risk. 
The most obvious course of action is trying to match the rate sensitivity of assets and 
liabilities. This method, however, goes against the basic banking activity of asset 
transformation. Other ways to combat interest rate risk is the use of derivative 
instruments, such as swaps, futures and options to mitigate possible interest rate changes. 
(Freixas & Rochet 2008: 284; Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 613-624.) 
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2.4.4. Market risk 
 
Also known as trading risk, market risk depicts the possibility of price movement that 
involves securities a bank might own. Since banking has come a long way from its 
original business model of financial intermediation, banks nowadays attempt to 
accumulate additional profits through trading securities, loans and derivatives. Market 
risk can be divided into general (or systematic) risk, meaning macroeconomic risks that 
affect all market instruments, and specific (or unsystematic) risk, which means 
unexpected price moves of a single instrument without any greater effect on the prices of 
other instruments (Heffernan 2005: 107-108). A bank can also be subject to market risk 
through lending to a company that invests in securities, so the credit risk of the loan in 
question correlates with the market risk of the company. (Casu et. al. 2015: 342-344; 
Cecchetti 2008: 291.) 
 
Stakeholder banks typically detain from participating in more exotic forms of banking. 
This stems directly from the fact that owners of stakeholder banks are also its customers. 
With their role as customers of the bank, the owners are more inclined to have the bank 
protect their savings by keeping away from more exotic (and possibly riskier) business 
strategies and rather focus on more traditional forms of banking. Another factor that 
contributes to stakeholder banks focusing on traditional banking forms is their limited 
access to the capital markets. Since they are unable to raise funding through market 
capitalization, stakeholder banks have a harder time achieving sufficient amounts of fresh 
financing for expanding their business portfolios. 
 
Banks typically use value-at-risk (VaR) analysis together with stress testing to determine 
the amount of market risk they are exposed to. VaR estimates through historical data the 
probability of a maximal loss during a certain time period on a chosen portfolio. Stress 
testing is used to calculate probable losses in a case of unusually disadvantageous events. 
Through these and other analyses banks can calculate their own market risk and bring it 
to a level more suitable according to its own requirements. (Cecchetti 2008: 291; 
Heffernan 2008: 107-109, 142-154; Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 455, 475.) 
 
2.4.5. Other risks 
 
Like any other industry, it is common for financial institutions to identify the possible 
risks they may face as risks created by themselves (micro risks) or by changes in their 
operational environment (macro risks). Possible macro risks a bank might face include 
  21 
 
changing currency exchange rates, government credit ratings and competitive 
environment, inflation, as well as industry deregulation. Potential micro risks cover 
unplanned operational costs, off-balance-sheet activities, legal disputes, reputation 
depreciation, poor lending choices and bad management. (Casu et. al. 2015: 339-348.) 
 
Essentially, micro risks can be categorized as two separate bank performance measures: 
cost efficiency and risk management. They indicate how well a bank is able to minimize 
costs that are unnecessary to its success, as well as identify possible risks in its operations 
and act accordingly. In this study, efficiency and risk management are considered 
measures of bank performance, and they will be used to find out whether stakeholder 
banks are more cost efficient and/or better at handling riskiness in their operations than 
shareholder banks, and which specific determinants contribute to this specific outcome. 
Macro risks are treated as independent variables, and they are included in the study to 
find out whether stakeholder banks are better at forecasting current market conditions and 
reacting accordingly. 
 
 
2.5. The Nordic banking sector 
 
The Nordic banking sector is tightly interconnected between its member countries, all of 
which are also very open towards other global markets as well. The sum of Norwegian 
and Swedish exports are 62 and 70 percent of their GDP, respectively. Studies have 
shown the four Nordic economies to be very closely linked, and that only a part of this 
collaboration is due to their geographical location. They are also considered safe havens 
by international investors due to their relatively stable macroeconomic conditions and 
history of fiscal prudence. Additionally, Finland and Sweden act as financial gatekeepers 
to the Baltic countries. Since they form a financial cluster together, it also implies that the 
countries are more heavily linked together than with the rest of the world, and that serious 
financial shocks to one of the countries easily propagates between them. (IMF 2013.) 
 
On top of strong financial integration, the Nordic countries also have large banking 
sectors relative to their GDP, with Sweden and Denmark’s banking sectors holding three 
to four times their GDP’s worth of financial assets. The large banking sectors are used to 
maintain the debt of the private sector and non-financial corporations, which are highly 
leveraged in Nordic countries. The Nordic banking sector is mostly dominated by a few 
publicly listed international banking insitutions that operate in all Nordic countries. They 
are large in terms of GDP, and they rely strongly on the wholesale markets for their 
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funding. Even though these large institutions operate internationally, nearly 80 percent of 
their operating income is generated within the Nordic region. Of the six largest banks, 
four have their parent companies based in Sweden. (IMF 2013.) 
 
Along with their macroeconomical benefits, the banking sectors in Nordic countries also 
serve the purpose of providing an efficient and reliable financial system for their 
economies. In recent years, the Nordic banking sector has been evolving because of large 
investments by banks in new digitalization solutions and a shift towards automatization 
of normal banking services. These investments have decreased the number of branch 
offices located around the country, as online banking services have become the new norm. 
Consequently, the remaining branch offices have shifted their orientation from providing 
banking services to advisory services and selling products and services. (Swedish 
Bankers’ Association 2019; Finance Finland 2018; Norges Bank 2018; Finance Denmark 
2018.) 
 
By the end of 2017, the Finnish banking sector was populated by 267 banks, a decrease 
of 12 banks from the previous year due to mergers and acquistions. Most of these banks 
belonged to one of the 12 Finnish banking groups or amalgamations. The banking sector 
employed nearly 21 000 workers, and had 970 branch offices around Finland. The 
number of both employees and branch offices has been steadily declining since the mid-
2000s. In 2017, Finnish banks held 157 billion euros worth of customer deposit, 56 and 
23 percent of which were from households and companies, respectively. They also had 
225 billion euros worth of outstanding loans to their customers, with respective household 
and company shares of 57 and 35 percent. Overall, the Finnish banking sector had one of 
the best capital adequacy ratios in the EU, with 21 percent of their capital being rated as 
the best possible kind. Also, the ratio of non-performing loans was only 1,4 percent, 
which is very low compared to other European countries. (Finance Finland 2018.) 
 
Of the four Nordic countries, Finland’s banking sector has one of the largest share of 
stakeholder banks. The three largest stakeholder banking groups, cooperative bank 
Osuuspankki and savings banks Säästöpankkiryhmä and Oma Säästöpankki held market 
shares of 40 percent of total outstanding loan shares and 42 percent of all domestic non-
MFI deposits. Finnish stakeholder banks typically have regional focuses, and are 
considered essential parts of local communities. Osuuspankki, the most prominent 
cooperative bank in the Nordic countries, is characterized by high level of executive 
function integration and centralization of its common services. (Finance Finland 2018.) 
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As of the end of 2018, the Swedish banking sector consisted of 124 banks. Of these banks, 
75 were categorized as shareholder banks (both domestic and foreign), and 49 as 
stakeholder banks. Its financial sector employed over 90 000 people and made up 4,1 
percent of the total Swedish GDP. In 2018, Swedish bank balance sheet items totaled        
9 272 billion SEK. Collectively, they held 4 370 billion SEK in deposits from their 
customers, 44 percent of which came from households, 24 percent from domestic 
companies and 19 percent from foreign depositors. They also lended out 4,281 billion 
SEK worth of loans, 33 percent of which were to Swedish businesses, and 30 percent to 
both Swedish households and foreign borrowers. (Swedish Bankers’ Association 2018.) 
 
The Swedish banking sector is mainly dominated by its four biggest banks: Swedbank, 
Svenska Handelsbanken, Svenska Enskilda Banken, and Nordea. Collectively, the “big-
four” have a market share of 62 percent of the total Swedish deposit market. The Swedish 
field of stakeholder banks consists mostly of savings banks, as well as two small 
cooperative banks. Most Swedish savings banks co-operate with Swedbank regarding 
their technical solutions as well as some of their products and services. Their collective 
share of the country’s deposit market is over 10 percent. However, stakeholder bank 
market share in local areas can easily exceed that figure. (Swedish Bankers’ Association 
2018.) 
 
Norway’s banking sector is fairly small compared to other European countries, as the 
sector’s total assets are about twice as much as the country’s GDP. This is due to the fact 
that the Norwegian banking sector is mainly focused on its domestic operations, and the 
share of international operations are limited. Although the sector has historically been 
dominated domestic banks, international subsidiaries and branch offices have began to 
increase their market share in Norway recently. The banking sector is highly 
concentrated, with the largest bank, DNB, holding a 39 percent deposit market share and 
a 30 percent lending market share. The sector’s total deposits from customers totaled 
2 439 billion NOK, with savings banks holding a 35 percent market share of deposits. 
The size of the lending market was 2 489 billion NOK, of which savings banks held a 25 
percent share. (Finans Norge 2018; Norges Bank 2018.) 
 
Norwegian banks are either commercial or savings banks, but according to Norway’s 
central bank, this classification has become increasingly irrelevant recently. Norwegian 
savings banks are mostly very small, but they have created alliances which allow them to 
operate more like commercial banks. The alliances jointly produce non-banking activities 
on their group level, while individual banks focus on providing regular banking services 
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in their local areas.  In order to access the capital market more easily, Norwegian savings 
banks have started to issue so-called equity certificates. These certificates act much like 
shares, with the distinction that the owners of these certificates do not have ownership 
rights to the issuer’s net assets. (Norges Bank 2018.) 
 
Much like its Nordic contemporaries, the Danish banking sector is also known for its 
efficient financial system. In 2017, it employed almost 40 000 people, held a total of 1 759 
billion DKK in deposits from their customers, and had 1 546 billion DKK in loans 
outstanding to their customers. The Danish banking sector is characterized by its large 
size when compared to the country’s total GDP, a high level of concentration while 
having a significant number of small banks, and a dominant share of domestic banks over 
foreign banks which are represented in Denmark by a few large international groups. The 
total assets of the banking sector are three times the country’s GDP, and the five largest 
companies comprise 81 percent of the total deposit market share. The number of banks 
operating in Denmark has halved since 2004, making it the largest decrease of the four 
countries during that time period. The number of branch offices has also decreased by 42 
percent since 2008, a development that is understandable given that the Danish banking 
sector is particularly known for its active development of IT services and digitalization. 
(Danish FSA 2018; Finance Denmark 2018.)   
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3. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
In all its severity and extensiveness, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 continues to 
be a major talking point in modern financial studies. What were the causes of the crisis? 
What were the consequences? What can be done in order to prevent another global crisis 
from happening? This chapter will go through the main characteristics of financial crises, 
the birth of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the role banks played in it, as well 
as the effects it has had on the financial sector. 
 
 
3.1. Financial crises as a phenomenon 
 
Mishkin and Eakins (2012: 204) describe financial crises as a disorder in the financial 
system that causes excessive asymmetric information between financial institutions and 
consumers. This disorder obstructs the proper flow of funds from surplus units to deficit 
units. Claessens and Kose (2013: 3-4) view financial crises as, to a degree, ultimate 
instances of market interaction between the financial system and the economy. They are 
often preceeded by periods of asset price and/or credit booms, such as the housing price 
bubble and credit boom prior to 2007. Booms are often fueled by changes in the market 
environment, such as deregulation and optimistic economic forecasts. The upward trends 
of booms are usually bigger and faster than situations seen in normal business cycles. 
(Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 204-206.) 
 
The same holds true for busts: they are severe, and measured asset price and credit busts 
are 10 to 15 times larger than normal economic downturns. The severity of the bust does 
however vary according to the assets in question; equity asset busts tend to have smaller 
effects on the real economy than those involving bank financing, such as real estate 
mortgages. Asset price busts can be caused by small negative changes in asset prices, 
which can be a result of normal changes in the fundamental value of an asset. The fall 
may increase defaults in the real sector, which in turn causes bigger default risks on the 
financial markets. This so called ‘adverse feedback loop’ means both the financial system 
and the real economy is left with less capital, making the crisis even worse. (Claessens & 
Kose 2013: 4-11; Davis 2010: 2-6.) 
 
What makes crisis situations even more problematic for banks is their increased risk-
taking and higher leverage during credit booms. This situation is typically aided by low 
interest rates that attract banks to hand out riskier loans in hopes for higher profits. As 
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households become more leveraged during credit booms, the chances of them paying back 
their debts decreases. As credit losses increase, depositors become more worried for the 
safety of their assets and want to cash them in, causing bank runs. Because of asymmetric 
information, depositors are unable to determine the status of their own bank. This, as well 
as the interconnectedness of modern financial markets, causes the runs to spread to banks 
that weren’t necessarily in bad shape in the first place. Bank runs generate fire sales as 
banks battle to sell their assets at any given price in order to cover for their credit losses 
and avoid insolvency. The failure of one financial institution further accelerates panic, 
causing more institutionss to go insolvent. Banks that are struggling to increase their 
liquidity drive up the interest rate of their loans. This attempt is however ineffective due 
to adverse selection, meaning only the riskiest loan takers are willing to accept the high 
interest rates. After the dust settles, bankrupt banks are either sold or liquidated by the 
authorities, anxiety towards the financial market dissipates, the stock market recuperates 
and the crisis fades away. (Claessens & Kose 2013: 4-11; Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 204-
208.) 
 
 
3.2. Evolution of the global financial crisis 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 can be seen to have begun over a decade earlier, 
as the prices of houses began to rise during the mid 1990s. In fact, there had been only 
one significant nominal decline in the OFHEO housing price index from 1975 to 2006. 
This further contributed to the idea of sustainable asset growth in the housing market. As 
the prices continued to grow for the next ten years, the boom was heavily assisted by 
increased lending activity on behalf of the financial institutions, as well as declining 
mortgage interest-rates that hit their lowest mark for the past 40 years in 2004. 
Furthermore, technological advancements, such as new data pooling methods enabled 
financial institutions to score potential borrowers based on their default risk. These factors 
aided in increasing the share of subprime mortgage loans on the mortgage markets from 
15 percent in 2001 to almost half of all mortgages in 2006. (Baily, Litan & Johnson 2008: 
11-13.) 
 
The early part of the housing boom was accompanied by rising income levels in the 
United States. As income growth slowly decelerated throughout the early 2000s, housing 
prices continued their climb. It coincided with the economic growth of developing 
countries around the world. This meant that there was an unusually large numbers of 
foreign investments flowing into the US housing markets. Also, global GDP growth 
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meant that the prices of basic commodities such as energy and food started to rise 
globally, evidenced by the growth of the Goldman Sachs Commodities index in the mid 
2000s. As US citizens had to spend more money on their food and electricity bills, their 
debt-to-income ratio started to rise. More and more subprime mortgages began to default 
due to this event and banks started to foreclose increasing amounts of mortgage collateral, 
finally resulting in the burst of the housing bubble. (Baily et. al. 2008: 12-20; 
Jagannathan, Kapoor & Schaumburg 2013: 23-25.) 
 
In the early 2000s banks began to construct new types of financial instruments constructed 
from pools of mortgage- and other asset-backed securities called collateralized debt 
obligations. These obligations, often abbreviated as CDOs, packaged together mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and other asset-backed securities (ABS), and then sold the rights 
for the cash flows of these securities forward to investors, ultimately re-securitizing actual 
securities. They worked a lot like mortgage-backed securities in the sense that they were 
divided into tranches that differed in the amounts of risk and return they contained, 
making them more widely desired between both high- and low-risk investors. CDOs 
allowed private individual investors to join in on the mortgage market sweepstakes 
without having to buy actual property. CDO issuers were able to convince credit rating 
agency to hand out highest possible credit ratings for the highest CDO tranches, and the 
obligations became an immediate source of high reward with relatively low amounts of 
risk in the eyes of investors. (Baily et. al. 2008: 7-9, 25-26.) 
 
As CDOs spread across the globe through global securities markets, insurance agencies, 
hedge funds, banks and other financial institutions began offering insurances to protect 
CDO holders from potential default risk. The buyers of these so-called credit default 
swaps (CDS) would pay their insuror a monthly fee for safety against possible defaults. 
In turn, the CDS seller would pay a reimbursement in the case of default to the CDS 
buyer. The CDS transactions were not managed by any regulatory institution, and all 
market interactions took place on over-the-counter markets. This made the overwatch and 
evaluation of CDS markets even more challenging. Furthermore, the CDS buyer wasn’t 
required to own the actual security being protected, hence making them a highly 
speculative financial instrument. Fooled by the steady income streams and high credit 
ratings of the CDOs, the CDS issuers did not believe they would endure losses from CDS 
trading until the turn of events in late 2007. (Baily et. al. 2008: 30-33.) 
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3.3. Effects of the global financial crisis on the Nordic countries 
 
Before the most recent financial crisis, the Nordic countries had previously experienced 
a severe financial crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. The crisis hit the hardest in Finland 
and Sweden, a result stemming from liberalization and deregulation of the capital markets 
of the two countries. The overheating of the capital markets finally led to a financial crisis 
and a deep recession ensued. As a result of the crisis, banks suffered big losses, and the 
Finnish and Swedish banking sectors experienced many bankruptcies despite 
governmental care packages. Structural changes made in the industry, as well as 
governmental support, finally started to pay dividends in 1993 and 1994, as the Finnish 
and Swedish economies broke out of the recession and the financial environment finally 
normalized. (Jonung, Kiander & Vartia 2009: 19-25, 62-64, 268-274.) 
  
Just like Finland and Sweden, Norway also suffered from a financial crisis in the 1990s. 
The crisis happened during the years 1991 and 1992 for a lot of the same reasons as the 
Finnish and Swedish crises, but it didn’t materialize in the same extent. Norway was able 
to dodge the more severe consequences of the crisis by using their government surplus to 
fund and save the troubled banks. Unlike the other Nordic countries, Denmark didn’t 
suffer from a severe crisis in the 1990s, especially when looking at the amount of bankrupt 
banks or bank losses. Their economy did struggle due to the general difficulties of other 
European economies, resulting in the decrease of employent and inflation figures. 
However, the Danish Central Bank didn’t restrict bank loan-taking or deposit and loan 
interest rates, which has been attributed as one of the reasons why thei banking sector 
managed to curb a more serious banking crisis and overcome the adversities quickly. 
(Jonung et. al. 2009: 202-204, 236-262.) 
 
The Nordic countries were hit harder by the global financial crisis that started in 2007 
than many other countries. As already stated in the previous chapter, the Nordic banking 
sectors, especially in Finland, Sweden and Denmark, are small and open to global 
economies, with a lot of their income depending on international operations. Before the 
start of the crisis the Nordic financial sectors were considered to be stable and low-risk. 
The crisis emanated to the countries from the outside when the export of investment goods 
and consumer products declined internationally. 2009 saw Finnish production, exports, 
and investments decrease by 8,2 percent, 20 percent, and 17 percent, respectively. After 
the problems from the foreign markets penetrated the Nordics, domestic demand started 
to also suffer. (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2011; Gylfason, Holmström, Korkman, 
Tson & Vihriälä 2010; Norden 2013.) 
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Even though the Nordic GDP dropped during the crisis, it didn’t cause such a drastic 
decline in consumer spending or employment rates thanks in most parts to the 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies conducted by the governments. While public 
finances still had adequate credit ratings and low risk premiums, these policies resulted 
in the sharp increase of public debt and trade deficit in all Nordic countries, especially in 
Finland. On the other hand, the monetary policies conducted by the European Central 
Bank allowed consumer and industrial loan interest rates to decline, making loan terms 
cheaper to encourage private spending, increase consumer demand, as well as diminish 
the amount of loan defaults that happened during the crisis. The policies also had a 
positive impact on the Nordic housing markets during the crisis, which maintained its 
value throughout the crisis. (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2011; Gylfason et. al. 2010; 
Norden 2013.) 
 
The nature of the crisis resulted in the most severe consequences being reflected on the 
financial sector and the global financial intermediation processes. The crisis affected the 
interbank markets by raising the risk premium on interbank loans. This in turn decreased 
the availability of financing, especially in the Nordic countries as they are more dependent 
on the global financial markets. However, the financial stability of Nordic banks didn’t 
change too drastically during the crisis, as none had to be bailed out or deleveraged. For 
the most part, Nordic banks had adequate levels of liquidity, which allowed them to 
absorb the negative shocks of the crisis. Bigger effects were seen on the securities market, 
where financing was tough to come by, and companies were forced to rely on domestic 
bank financing for the time of the crisis. (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2011; Gylfason 
et. al. 2010; Norden 2013.) 
 
The financial crisis changed the whole economic landscape of the Nordic economies. 
Many of the companies that previously worked in production intensive industries shifted 
towards more service-oriented business functions. Even though the crisis didn’t have such 
severe effects on the Nordic banking sector, its consequences were serious and 
longlasting. Finland and Denmark have still yet to reach their pre-crisis GDP growth rates, 
and while Sweden and Norway reached their pre-crisis economic growth already in 2010, 
it has slowed down recently. Norway had an advantage over the other Nordic countries 
by virtue of their oil and petroleum export business, which has helped drive the country’s 
economy and its demand impulses. Sweden’s advantage over Finland and Denmark was 
that it could exploit the decrease in the value of their currency, the Swedish Krona, and 
the subsequent increase in their international export competitiveness. Both Finland and 
Denmark have already shown signs of recovery. As the Nordic markets are open and rely 
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on the global economy, the growing economies worldwide will eventually help boost the 
economies back to their old level. (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2011; Gylfason et. al. 
2010; Norden 2013.) 
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4. PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
This chapter first presents previous studies conducted on the subject of stakeholder 
banking and their most relevant findings regarding the topic. Second, the research 
hypotheses are formed based on the findings of the pre-existing literature as well as the 
setup of this thesis. 
 
 
4.1. Previous literature 
 
In their seminal paper, Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2007) study the effect of ownership 
structure on the risk and performance of large European banks between 1999 and 2004. 
They differentiate between government-owned, mutual, and privately owned banks, and 
control for banks that are listed in the stock market. They find that statistically significant 
performance differences exist between the different forms of ownership. Privately owned 
banks tend to be more profitable than their counterparts due to higher net returns on assets. 
Mutual banks are seen to be closer to private than public banks, but with lower 
profitability due to smaller size and a more traditional asset-mix compared to private 
banks.  Their results further support the notion that government-owned banks, although 
not being the most profitable, are able to operate with less capitalization, lower costs and 
more risk than other banks. They are able to take more risk in their activities due to the 
additional governmental support they receive compared to other banks. (Iannotta, Nocera 
& Sironi 2007.) 
 
Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola (2015) research a similar topic, but with a wider variety of 
ownership types and over a more recent time period. In this paper, the authors expand on 
their paper from 2014, that discusses the effect of bank ownerhip on bank lending 
behaviour. They divide banks into six ownership categories: Tightly and loosely 
integrated co-operative banks, private and public savings banks, and general and 
specialized shareholder banks. In order to measure performance, they use two additional 
variables along with profitability: cost efficiency and loan quality. They find this 
necessary since using just profitability to measure performance is not entirely feasible, 
since stakeholder banks do not focus solely on profit maximization. Their findings 
suggest that there are existing subgroups within the typical categorization of shareholder, 
cooperative, and savings banks that need to be taken into account when conducting such 
research because of their own specialities and peculiarities. (Ferri, Kalmi & Kerola 2015.) 
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Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) study the correlation of local competition and stability 
between European cooperative banks between the years 1998 and 2009. Their research is 
based on the assumption that since cooperative banks work closely with their respective 
local businesses, they also acquire more “soft information” on their clients than 
commercial banks. In a competitive environment, instead of increasing the risk they are 
willing to take, cooperative banks focus increasingly on relationship banking to provide 
them with a competitive advantage. Furthermore, they argue that the impact of 
competition on cooperative bank stability is higher in more homogenous banking 
systems, where banks demonstrate more herding behaviour in relation to one another. 
Their results prove that the amount of competition does correlate positively with the 
stability of the observed cooperative banks. The correlation is stronger in homogenous 
market areas, suggesting that there might be a “too-many-to-fail” problem embedded in 
cooperative bank closure policies. They also observe that the financial crisis did not have 
a siginificant impact on the correlation between the years 2007 and 2009. (Fiordelisi & 
Mare 2014.) 
 
Much like the research conducted by Fiordelisi and Mare in 2014, Clark, Mare and Radic 
(2018) study the relationship between cooperative banking stability and the level of 
market power they have in countries where cooperative banks are most commonly found 
(more specifically, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain). Their study focuses on the 
specific cooperative business model, which concentrates heavily on the deposit and loan 
markets. Contrary to the findings of Fiordelisi and Mare, they find that market power non-
linearly increases stability, and that most of the stability of individual banks is generated 
by market power in the loan markets. Higher levels of competition is thus found to be 
detrimental to the stability of cooperative banks. Furthermore, market power in the 
deposit market, as well as asset and liability diversification is found to increase bank 
solvency. (Clark, Mare & Radic 2014.) 
 
In their study, Ferri, Kalmi, and Kerola (2014) focus on the effects of the ownership 
model of European banks to their lending behaviour. They derive their data from bank 
financial statements between 1999 and 2011. They use different forms of ownership to 
categorize their data into either shareholder or stakeholder banks, the latter comprising of 
savings banks and cooperative banks. The reasoning behind this division is that, unlike 
shareholder banks, stakeholder banks focus on maximizing consumer surplus rather than 
profit maximization. Their findings suggest that stakeholder banks, especially 
cooperative banks, differ from shareholder banks in their lending patterns. Stakeholder 
banks tend to smoothen their lending according to the business cycle, i.e. they do not 
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increase or decrease their lending as drastically as shareholder banks during boom or bust 
cycles, respectively. Because of this, the researchers argue that stakeholder banks have 
“the potential to reduce credit supply volatility” in the local economy. (Ferri, Kalmi & 
Kerola 2014.) 
 
In their ECB working paper, De Santis and Surico (2013) examine how changes in the 
European monetary policy affects the availability of credit towards German, French, 
Italian, and Spanish banks, and whether this relationship is driven by certain bank 
characteristics. The study uses bank data between the years 1999 and 2011 to investigate 
whether non-systematic changes in the monetary policies conducted by the ECB had an 
effect on the lending activities and cost of funding of banks during the time period. They 
further differentiate between commercial, cooperative, and mutual banks in order to 
control for differences between bank typologies. Their findings show that while the 
transmission of monetary policy to bank lending activities is heterogenous across across 
countries as well as different types of banks within a country, the results are homogenous 
within a certain bank typology in each country. They also find that changes in funding 
costs caused by changes in the monetary policy had the largest impact on Italian saving 
banks, and German cooperative and saving banks. They use this finding to prove that 
stakeholder banks play a key role in refinancing the real economy after a non-systematic 
negative shock, and that the increased number of savings and cooperative banks improves 
the transmission of monetary policy changes to the real economy in the Euro area. (De 
Santis & Surico 2013.) 
 
Kontolaimou and Tsekouras (2010) investigate the differences in technological efficiency 
between cooperative, savings and commercial banks. They presume that due to the mutual 
ownership structure and the agency problem that it creates,  cooperative banks tend to be 
less agile in adapting to the latest technological advancements, thus making them 
financially less productive. They use their data sample of European banks to create an 
efficiency frontier which the sample banks are examined. Their findings support the 
notion that banks which are more focused on profit maximization (i.e. commercial banks) 
are more efficient in adapting new technologies and comprise most of the efficient 
frontier. Cooperative banks are found to be very heterogenous in their technological 
efficiency, and that while as a whole they are not technologically efficient, a number of 
them do attempt to emulate the commercial leaders. The research also suggests that, 
contrary to the original assumption, the techonological inefficiency of cooperative banks 
is not caused by the agency problem, but rather because of their more traditional operating 
environment. (Kontolaimou & Tsekouras 2010.) 
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In their 2013 paper, Fiordelisi and Mare examine Italian cooperative banks and their risk 
of default. According to them, cooperative banks are more likely to default (or be allowed 
to default by government officials) because of their small size and the too-big-to-fail 
policy prevalent in the banking industry. Thus, it is relevant to find bank-specific 
efficiencies that help counteract the possibility of defaulting. The study recognizes three 
key factors that enhance a cooperative bank’s probability of survival: cost efficiency, 
revenue management and profit-efficiency. Along with these three measures, also asset 
quality, liquidity ratio and size are found to affect a bank’s probability of default. Their 
findings suggest that traditional financial performance measures are adequate distress 
predictors also for cooperative banks. Fiordelisi and Mare 2013.) 
 
Girardone, Nankervis and Velentza (2009) look at the efficiency of banks in the EU-15 
countries between 1998 and 2003 based on their ownership structure and the financial 
structure of the country they operate in. They aim to prove that the agency cost principle 
does not apply to banking, as a multitude of previous studies have stated the contrary, 
showing that European savings and cooperative banks have historically been more cost-
efficient than commercial banks in general. After dividing their data sample into three 
different categories (commercial, savings and cooperative banks), they further subdivide 
the banks nationally based on how stock-market oriented a country is.  They are able to 
reject the agency theory hypothesis by showing that mutual banks included in their sample 
are significantly more cost efficient than commercial banks. They also find savings banks 
operating in bank-based economies to have major cost efficiency advantages over banks 
operating in market-based, as well as commercial banks in general. (Girardone, Nankervis 
& Velentza 2009.) 
 
 
4.2. Research hypotheses 
 
Based on the previous literature written about the subject of stakeholder bank, we can 
now postulate the research hypotheses for this thesis. In this thesis, we are interested in 
the performance of Nordic stakeholder banks, as well as the specific determinants that 
drive their performance. The best way to categorize the different hypotheses that will be 
examined in this thesis is to divide them into three separate categories. The categories are 
stakeholder bank performance compared to shareholder bank performance during the 
financial crisis, stakeholder bank performance compared to shareholder bank 
performance after the financial crisis, and determinants of stakeholder bank performance 
during and after the financial crisis. In the first two groups, there will be three research 
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hypotheses, one for each performance measure, while the third gorup will have two. The 
need for three separate hypotheses for the first two gorups is due to the three performance 
measures used in thesis: profitability, cost efficiency, and loan quality. 
 
For the first group, the research hypotheses will examine whether Nordic stakeholder 
banks were able to outperform shareholder banks during the financial crisis. Most of the 
previous studies state that stakeholder banks have been able to outperform shareholder 
banks during the financial crisis. Furthermore, the common perception regarding 
stakeholder banks is that their countercyclical nature and their lower risk levels allow 
them to avoid some of the negative impacts of the financial crisis. Thus, the null 
hypotheses will be stated as follows: 
 
H11: Nordic stakeholder banks were more profitable than Nordic shareholder banks 
during the financial crisis. 
 
H21: Nordic stakeholder banks were more cost efficient than Nordic shareholder banks 
during the financial crisis. 
 
H31: Nordic stakeholder banks had better loan quality than Nordic shareholder banks 
during the financial crisis.  
 
For the second group, the hypotheses will analyze Nordic stakeholder bank performance 
after the financial crisis compared to shareholder banks. While there haven’t been any 
studies on stakeholder banks that would have focused on the post-crisis period, we can 
assume that due to more normalized economic conditions it resembles the pre-crisis 
period. During normal economic conditions, stakeholder banks have usually been found 
to be less profitable. For cost efficiency, there have been mixed findings. Some studies 
have found savings banks to be more inefficient while cooperative banks have been more 
efficient than commercial banks. Others have also found cooperative banks to be more 
inefficient. For loan quality, many studies suggest that stakeholder banks have more soft 
information on their customers and thus better quality loans. For these reasons, the null 
hypotheses will be stated as follows: 
 
H12: Nordic stakeholder banks were less profitable than Nordic shareholder banks after 
the financial crisis. 
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H22: Nordic stakeholder banks were less cost efficient than Nordic shareholder banks 
after the financial crisis. 
 
H32: Nordic stakeholder banks had better loan quality than Nordic shareholder banks 
after the financial crisis. 
 
For the final two research hypotheses, the determinants of Nordic stakeholder bank 
performance are examined, both in relation to the economic situation as well as their 
shareholder counterparts. Previous research on determinants of bank performance has not 
been performed specifically on stakeholder banks, so no excpectations can be made based 
on previous studies. Thus, assumptions will have to be based on more general 
information. For example, Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) prove that bank profitability 
is driven by different determinants depending on the current economic situation. Also, it 
can be deduced based on the fundamental differences in the operations of stakeholder 
banks and shareholder banks that their performance determinants should differ from each 
other. Thus, the final two research hypotheses will be stated followingly: 
 
H13: The determinants of Nordic stakeholder bank performance were different during 
and after the financial crisis. 
 
H23: The determinants of Nordic stakeholder bank performance differ from those of 
Nordic shareholder banks.  
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter goes through the theory of bank valuation and how to measure bank 
performance. The data used in the empirical part of this research is also examined more 
closely, as well as the different variables and other parameters that have been used to 
define the data sample more specifically. The regression model is introduced, along with 
the research hypotheses that will be set for the results of the empirical research. 
 
 
5.1. Valuation of banks 
 
When valuing banks and other financial intermediaries one must take into account the 
differences they hold over corporations working in other industrial sectors. The biggest 
disparity comes from how their revenue accumulation differs from that of normal 
companies. The most common types of income banks generate can be divided into four 
groups: net interest income, fee and commission income, trading income and other 
income. For a long time, net interest income was the most dominant type of income for 
all banks. However, over the last few decades, its meaning has decreased as large 
investment banks and other major financial intermediaries make most of their profits 
through fees and commissions, and also through trading. This shift has been a major 
reason for banks becoming more procyclical, and thus more vulnerable to economic 
downturns, during recent years. (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2015: 713-716.) 
 
Valuing banks from the outside can be extremely difficult, since the financial statements 
they release provide only a partial picture on their true economic situation. Vital details, 
such as the amount of credit losses and the mismatch of assets and liabilities, can be left 
out. Furthermore, high leverage and wide range of financial operations make valuations 
laborious and highly contingent on the prevailing economic situation. (Koller et. al. 2015: 
713-716.) 
 
The core operations of financial institutions consist of interest income and expenses. 
These cash flows are linked to the company’s equity, which makes the cash-flow-to-
equity valuation model the most accurate for valuing banks. The equity value can be 
calculated by dividing the future cash flows to equity by the discounted cost of equity. 
The future equity cash flows are estimated by subtracting the increase in the book value 
of equity from net income (earnings theoretically available to shareholders after 
expenses), and adding other noncash comprehensive income (for example net unrealized 
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gains and losses on equity and debt investments). Although this valuation is theoretically 
accurate, it fails to take certain notable factors into account; it doesn’t show how the 
company is creating its value, it fails to consider the impact and risk on the cost of equity, 
and it ignores tax penalty that is enforced on holding equity risk capital. (Koller et. al. 
2015: 716-726.)  The question of how banks create their value can be answered through 
economic-spread analysis, which is explained next. 
 
 
Figure 3. Generic Value Driver Tree for Retail Banking: Economic Spread (Koller et. al. 2015: 
729) 
 
 
Economic-spread analysis focuses on the different operations through which banks create 
value. It compares the interest rate a bank has on its loans and deposits to the respective 
matched-opportunity rates. Matched-opportunity rate is the rate of return that could have 
been acquired by investing in a financial istrument similar to the loan or deposit in both 
risk and maturity. This makes it easier to see if certain functions are actually creating or 
destroying value at their current rates. It also takes into account the natural maturity 
mismatch banks have between their assets and liabilities. Figure 3 presents the key 
variables which drive value creation in economic-spread analysis. (Koller et. al. 2015: 
726-730.) 
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5.2. Measuring bank performance 
 
The previous chapter discussed about the various ways banks create cash flows and value 
through their businesses. All the different types of value creation in one way or another 
add up to how well the bank is performing. The most common way to measure a bank’s 
performance is through financial ratio analysis. Ratios that will be used in this thesis to 
measure bank performance are return on assets (ROA), cost-to-income -ratio (C/I), and 
ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets (LLP). (Casu et. al. 2015: 279-282.) 
 
ROA is the most commonly used performance metric for measuring bank profitability. It 
is calculated by dividing the yearly net income a bank has been able to create by their 
total amount of assets: 
 
(1) 𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡
 
 
It is a useful measure for correcting the amount of income a bank has created relative to 
its size. Simply put, it reflects how well a bank’s assets are being put to use, since it tells 
how effectively they are being used to generate profit. 
 
The C/I -ratio is calculated by dividing non-interest expenses with the sum of net interest 
income and non-interest income: 
 
(2) 𝐶/𝐼 =
𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 
 
It can be used to measure how efficiently a bank is being run. Essentially, the C/I -ratio 
illustrates the ratio of a bank’s production input (non-interest expenses) to the production 
output it is able to generate (sum of net interest and non-interest income). A lower C/I -
ratio thus implies better bank cost efficiency. 
 
Loan quality shows the percentage of loan loss provisions a bank has booked to its balance 
sheet during a fiscal year due to the possibility of unpaid loans, so it reflects the credit 
riskiness of a bank. It is calculated as the ratio of loan loss provisions to its total loans: 
 
(3) 𝐿𝐿𝑃 =
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
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This variable has an inverse relationship with performance; a lower score means better 
loan quality, and thus better performance. Loan quality is a limited measure of bank 
riskiness, since it only measures the amount of risk a bank has relative to its lending 
activities. However, while it does not account for risk deriving from non-traditional 
banking activities produced by banks, it can still be assumed that lending is the core 
business for most banks, and that risk in lending operations can reflect overall bank risk 
behaviour. Furthermore, more aggressive banks may be inclined to book loan loss 
provisions more hesitantly, since the bookings affect their earnings. (Casu et. al. 2015: 
282-287; Mishkin & Eakins 2012: 419-420.) 
 
This thesis investigates how different bank-specific and macroeconomic variables affect 
the performance of Nordic shareholder banks and stakeholder banks, and how those 
effects vary between the two. The period is further divided into two time periods, crisis 
period (from 2008 to 2012) and the post-crisis period (from 2012 to 2017). These 
periodical results will then be analyzed to see how the variables have affected bank 
performance during different parts of the economic cycle, and whether their importance 
has changed. After finding out the determinants of stakeholder and shareholder bank 
performance during and after the financial crisis, the results are compared between each 
other to see how the bank-specific and macroeconomic factors might vary. In the second 
part, the impact of crisis-period performance of stakeholder and shareholder banks is 
usewd to predict performance advantages after the crisis in order to see, whether being 
able to perform well during the crisis period had a positive or negative effect on a bank’s 
post-crisis performance. 
 
 
5.3. Dependent variables 
 
When normally measuring bank performance, the three variables used are the return on 
average assets (ROAA), the return on average equity (ROAE), and the net interest margin 
(NIM). These factors are all measures of bank profitability. However, since the main 
focus of the business model of stakeholder banks is consumer surplus maximization and 
not profit maximization, other factors also need to be taken into consideration. In their 
2015 paper, Ferri et. al. use loan quality (measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
total loans) and cost efficiency (measured by non-interest expenses divided by the sum of 
non-interest income and net interest income), along with ROAA as the measure for 
profitability (measured by the returns for year t divided by the average of assets between 
years t-1 and t), in order to measure bank performance more widely. These variables are 
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considered to be standard measures of bank performance also by banking literature (eg. 
Casu et. al. 2015: 279-282). These variables were already discussed in more detail in the 
previous chapter. 
 
 
5.4. Independent variables 
 
For independent variables, both bank-specific, or microeconomic variables, as well as 
country-specific, or macroeconomic variables are used. Period and country-specific fixed 
effects are also used to control for yearly variation, as well as differences in taxation, 
accounting specifications, and the nature of competition between the different countries. 
 
5.4.1. Bank-specific variables 
 
For bank-specific control measures, a list of variables that have been fairly standard in 
previous researches (e.g. Ferri et. al. 2015; Iannotta et. al. 2007; Fiordelisi and Mare 2014) 
is used. The specific variables used are size, capital ratio, share of loans, share of non-
interest income, and liquidity. 
 
Size is calculated and used as the natural logarithm of the total assets of a bank in order 
to normalize the distribution of the data. In previous studies, size has been found to be a 
significant positive factor for profitability. This is likely due to the fact that bigger size 
gives banks a competitive advantage over smaller banks by enabling banks to diversify 
their business models, as well as enabling them to take more risks without affecting their 
financial stability too greatly. Stakeholder banks tend to be smaller compared to their 
shareholder counterparts. 
 
Capital ratio (the ratio of a bank’s equity to its total assets) reflects the level of 
capitalization of a bank. It is typically linked to a bank’s level of risk-taking, and is 
considered one of the most important independet variables for bank performance, 
although with mixed results. The effect of the capital ratio on bank performance can be 
difficult to anticipate beforehand, since previous studies and theories have conflicting 
evidence on its impact. The higher a bank’s capital ratio is, the lower its risk and funding 
costs are considered to be. It is also a sign of better creditworthiness and lower need for 
additional external funding. However, as suggested by the risk-return hypothesis, lower 
capital ratio should create better profitability and thus, better performance. During crisis 
times, the increased risk created by a lower level of capitalization makes this assumption 
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even more questionable. Therefore, the impact of capital ratio on bank performance is 
difficult to determine beforehand. It would be logical to think that stakeholder banks 
would prefer to be better capitalized due to the lower risk factor. However, since their 
means of capitalization are limited, stakeholder banks might have to rely more heavily on 
external funding in order to run their operations. 
 
Liquidity is the ratio of a bank’s liquid assets compared to its total assets. This variable 
describes a bank’s ability to meet its financial obligations when they are due. During 
normal financial conditions, a bank’s obligations are fairly straightforward to predict. 
Holding surplus liquid assets instead of putting them into better use can be considered 
inefficient, especially if no big changes in market conditions is expected. Financial crises, 
however, tend to sharply increase the amount of unexpected costs and liquidity demands 
a bank faces, especially if the crisis gives birth to a bank run situation. It can thus be 
assumed, that a higher liquidity ratio can constitute to better bank performance especially 
during the crisis period, and vice versa during normal conditions.  
 
The share of loans is calculated by the bank’s total amount of loans outstanding divided 
by its total assets. It is used to measure the business model of a bank. Loans are typically 
considered to be more profitable compared to other types of assets, but they can also be 
more expensive to produce. Their performance is also related to the prevailing interest 
rate levels set by the current market conditions. A higher loans-to-assets ratio typically 
suggests that a bank directs a higher share of its available assets towards more traditional 
bank lending activities, which is also thought to be a staple of stakeholder banking. Its 
effect on bank performance can be difficult to anticipate, as its impact is dependent on 
the riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio. Because it is assumed that stakeholder banks are 
more involved in relationship banking than shareholder banks, it could also be argued that 
the share of loans correlates more positively with performance in stakeholder banks than 
it does in shareholder banks. 
 
The share of non-interest income shows the share of non-traditional banking activities of 
a bank in relation to its total income. Fee-based income tends to have a higher margin, 
and trading activity is also usually higher compared to more traditional banking. This 
would mean traditional banking activities would yield lower profits than non-traditional 
activities. However, some studies (e.g. Beltratti & Stulz 2012; Fahlenbrach et. al. 2011) 
have found that a lower non-interest income share was typically associated with higher 
bank performance during the financial crisis, due to the fact that traditional banking 
activities were less exposed to the risks created by the crisis. This would in turn suggest 
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that the coefficient for the variable may vary during the different time periods, and that it 
is not possible to forecast beforehand. 
 
5.4.2. Macroeconomic variables 
 
Just like any other business, also banks face macroeconomic factors that affect their 
performance. The GDP growth rate is a common measure for the national and 
international state of the business cycle. As a macroeconomic variable, it can be used to 
detect if a bank’s performance evolves along with GDP growth. Typically, banks increase 
their lending activity and raise their interest rates during an economic upswing. The 
opposite can be also expected during economic recessions. Economic downturns may 
also bring about an increase in bad loans, which in turn affect the loan loss provisions of 
banks. However, as stated before, stakeholder banks are thought to act countercyclically 
during recessions, as they usually have more soft information on their clients, and thus 
more knowledge on their financial status. Based on previous research, GDP growth can 
be expected to have a positive correlation with shareholder banks, and vice versa with 
stakeholder banks. 
 
Table 1. Expected coefficients of the independent variables 
 
 
The effect of national inflation on bank performance is dependent on the bank’s ability to 
forecast future inflation and adjusting its expenses accordingly. Some previous studies 
(e.g. Albertazzi & Gambacorta 2009; Athanasoglou, Brissimis & Delis 2008) have shown 
ROAA C/I LLP ROAA C/I LLP
Size + - + +/- - -
Natural logarithm of 
total assets
Fitch
Capital ratio + - - - - - Equity to total assets Fitch
Liquidity + - + - - +
Liquidity to total 
assets
Fitch
Loans to assets + - +/- - + +/- Loans to total assets Fitch
Share of non-interest 
income
- - + + - +/-
Non-interest income 
to total income
Fitch
GDP growth + - - + - -
Nominal GDP 
growth rate
World Bank
Inflation rate +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- CPI inflation rate World Bank
Data 
Source
Expected coefficients
Crisis period Post-crisis periodVariables Measure
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there to be a positive correlation between inflation and bank performance. Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta (2009) state that the reasoning behind this is that bank fees correlate 
positively with inflation because they are tied to the nominal value of the assets a bank is 
managing. However, inflation can also be seen to increase volatility in an economy, as 
well as reduce the demand for credit. Furthermore, a bank’s inability to properly forecast 
inflation and make changes to their protocols accordingly can affect negatively on its 
performance. Due to this, the coefficient for inflation is difficult to predict beforehand. 
 
 
5.5. Data 
 
The data used for the empirical analysis is gathered from the financial statement 
information between the years 2008 and 2017, provided by the Fitch database. All the 
dependent variables, as well as the bank-specific variables are obtained from this data. 
The GDP growth and CPI inflation rate data has been collected from the World Bank 
open database for all the Nordic countries. In total, Fitch covers 180 Finnish banks, 223 
Norwegian banks, 172 Danish banks, and 188 Swedish banks over the whole time period, 
for a total of 763 banks. After controlling for banks that are not considered commercial 
banks (such as central banks, investment banks, private banks, credit institutions and bank 
holding companies), as well as banks with no relative information available, 544 banks 
are left as the final data. There are 371 stakeholder banks in total. Of the 544 eligible 
banks, 145 are Finnish, 104 are Swedish, 174 are Norwegian, and and 121 are Danish. 
Stakeholder banks in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark consist only of savings banks, while 
Finland has both savings and cooperative banks.Of the 544 observed banks, 405 have 
relevant observations during the period of the financial crisis, while 484 banks are 
observed after the crisis period. 
 
 
5.6. Methodology 
 
Because of the two-dimensional nature of the data that is being used in this empirical 
analysis, the most suitable method to conduct the analysis is the panel data regression 
model. This is because it best describes the dynamics of change within banks and their 
specific characteristics over the determined time period, while also taking into account 
the heterogeneity of each bank and its variables. In order to control more rigorously for 
differences between individual banks, they must be accounted for in the regression 
through the use of either fixed or random effects. In order to determine which of the two 
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is more approriate, the Hausman test for endogeneity is applied onto the regressions. After 
running the Hausman test, the results suggest that fixed effects should be used when 
controlling between different banks. This is an expected result because of the large 
number of banks in the sample data compared to the length of the time period, as well as 
the fact that bank-specific characteristics can be considered to be non-stochastic and 
persistent over the specified time period. 
 
For this particular analysis, two different types of regression models are used, in order to 
differentiate between the two research questions: does the performance of stakeholder 
banks differ significantly from that of shareholder banks, and do the determinants that 
contribute to the performance measures differ between the two. The model follows the 
method used by Ferri et. al. (2015)  in order to determine, how stakeholder banks have 
performed during and after the financial crisis compared to shareholder banks. The 
regression model is determined as follows: 
 
(4) 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖
1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡
3 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 
Yi,t = The performance of bank i at year t (estimated by either ROAA, cost-to-income 
ratio, or share of loan-loss provisions) 
c  = The constant term 
X1i = A bank-specific dummy variable, which equals 1 if a bank is considered a 
stakeholder and 0 otherwise 
X2i,t-1 = Bank-specific independent variables at year t-1 
X3i,t = Macroeconomic independent variables at year t 
εit = The error term. 
 
This regression model is used when all the bank data is included. Bank-specific variables 
are lagged by one year in order to account for endogeneity between the variables and the 
error term. The model also uses a dummy variable in order to differentiate between the 
performance of stakeholder banks and shareholder banks. Due to the use of the dummy 
variable, bank-specific fixed effects cannot be applied. This is because the two dummies 
would create a multicollinearity issue with the model. Instead, a country fixed effect is 
applied in order to control for the observable and unobservable time-invariant differences 
in operating environments between banks from the different Nordic countries. A time 
fixed effect is also added in order to account for time-variant deviations between different 
years. 
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The second regression model is used for analysing the differences in the determinants of 
performance between stakeholder and shareholder banks. For this purpose, the two 
groups of banks will be separated and analysed individually. It is thus logical that this 
regression model does not include the stakeholder bank dummy variable like the previous 
model. Otherwise the model follows the same principals as the previous one. The second 
regression model is thus determined as follows: 
 
(5) 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 
Yi,t = The performance of bank i at year t (depicted by either ROAA, cost-to-income 
ratio, or share of loan-loss provisions) 
c  = The constant term 
X1i,t-1 = Bank-specific independent variables at year t-1 
X2i,t = Macroeconomic independent variables at year t 
εit = The error term. 
 
As the stakeholder bank dummy is omitted from this regression model, it is then 
appropriate to apply the bank fixed effects to control for the differences between 
individual banks. Due to the application of bank fixed effects, country fixed effects are 
not included in this regression model due to the multicollinearity issue. Aside from these 
two deviations from the first regression model, the second model is otherwise similar in 
structure.  
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6. RESULTS 
 
This chapter analyses the descriptive statistics of the data being used in the empirical 
analysis, as well as the results of the thesis that have been derived from the regression 
models. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables used in the panel data analysis. They are further subdivided into categories 
based on time period and ownership type in order to differentiate between the parameters 
set for this study. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the Nordic banking sector. 
 
 
When looking at the figures of all banks, there are clear timeline trends that can be seen. 
Nordic banks have been more profitable (ROAA), cost efficient (C/I-ratio), and less risky 
ALL BANKS Average Median St. Dev. Average Median St. Dev. Average Median St. Dev.
ROAA 0,66 0,66 1,48 0,42 0,49 1,28 0,85 0,78 1,60
CostToIncomeRatio 59,94 58,57 81,09 63,12 60,95 95,74 57,29 57,05 66,34
LoanLossProvisions 0,61 0,17 1,46 0,87 0,29 1,60 0,41 0,11 1,30
TotalAssets 74 095 3 043 324 885 74 605 3 075 317 907 73 669 2 992 330 584
Capital Ratio 12,51 10,51 10,80 11,70 9,46 11,10 13,19 11,42 10,50
Liquidity 19,82 13,24 19,72 22,01 15,53 20,61 18,11 11,83 18,81
LoansToAssets 71,94 77,23 18,05 72,09 77,54 18,29 71,82 77,02 17,85
Share of non-int. Op. Inc. 26,01 25,52 95,41 21,15 23,32 72,49 30,04 27,88 110,73
GDPGrowth 1,00 1,24 2,11 0,23 0,69 2,66 1,64 1,92 1,17
InflationRate 1,59 1,48 1,16 2,07 2,31 1,13 1,20 1,04 1,04
STAKEHOLDER BANKS Average Median St. Dev. Average Median St. Dev. Average Median St. Dev.
ROAA 0,66 0,72 0,82 0,47 0,58 0,76 0,81 0,82 0,83
CostToIncomeRatio 61,45 59,37 33,30 63,74 61,28 44,75 59,69 58,00 20,42
LoanLossProvisions 0,46 0,16 1,02 0,66 0,27 1,11 0,30 0,11 0,91
TotalAssets 8 327 2 142 25 082 7 401 2 229 17 828 9 036 1 990 29 433
Capital Ratio 12,35 11,43 5,23 11,44 10,45 5,30 13,05 12,06 5,07
Liquidity 17,01 12,21 17,06 19,02 14,21 18,16 15,55 11,02 16,06
LoansToAssets 74,73 78,86 13,86 75,35 79,43 13,40 74,26 78,33 14,19
Share of non-int. Op. Inc. 26,11 25,08 84,88 18,96 22,00 61,09 31,52 27,78 98,81
GDPGrowth 1,01 1,09 2,01 0,30 0,69 2,56 1,55 1,92 1,21
InflationRate 1,58 1,48 1,16 2,04 2,20 1,14 1,22 1,04 1,04
SHAREHOLDER BANKS Average Median St. Dev. Average Median St. Dev. Average Median St. Dev.
ROAA 0,64 0,47 2,30 0,32 0,34 1,89 0,94 0,66 2,60
CostToIncomeRatio 56,77 55,72 134,24 62,00 59,79 149,17 51,60 52,30 117,36
LoanLossProvisions 0,96 0,24 2,11 1,30 0,44 2,26 0,67 0,12 1,93
TotalAssets 211 535 14 183 544 872 196 989 10 147 511 207 225 949 16 546 575 931
Capital Ratio 12,85 8,01 17,41 12,16 7,06 17,20 13,53 8,72 17,58
Liquidity 26,14 19,19 23,46 27,87 23,21 23,65 24,54 16,20 23,16
LoansToAssets 66,02 69,33 23,62 66,04 69,20 23,80 66,01 69,42 23,45
Share of non-int. Op. Inc. 25,80 26,71 114,09 25,04 25,63 89,07 26,56 28,00 134,56
GDPGrowth 0,98 1,34 2,30 0,09 0,48 2,83 1,86 1,96 1,03
InflationRate 1,62 1,48 1,17 2,11 2,31 1,10 1,14 0,98 1,02
2009 - 2017 2009 - 2012 2013 - 2017
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(Loan Loss Provisions) after the crisis than during it. These are all expected results since 
the economy has been growing during the latter part. Banks have also increased their 
capital ratio, as new regulations that were enacted after the crisis have been enforced upon 
them. They have decreased their liquidity and loans shares from total assets, and increased 
their non-interest yielding operations, showing increased confidence in the financial 
markets, which has in turn allowed them to expand on their respective service portfolios. 
 
There are both expected and unexpected results when looking at the differences in the 
statistics between stakeholder and shareholder banks. On average, stakeholder banks are 
smaller, less cost efficient, and less risky than shareholder banks across all time periods, 
all the while being also more focused on traditional banking activities. They were also 
more profitable during the crisis, but lost their advantage in the post-crisis period, which 
is an expected result. More surprisingly, they had on average a smaller capital ratio and 
less liquidity both during and after the crisis. Furthermore, stakeholder banks increased 
their non-interest yielding operations more aggressively after the crisis than shareholder 
banks. Based on the deviation of the figures, shareholder banks seem to be a more 
heterogenous group than stakeholder banks, since their figures tend to vary more 
drastically across different variables. For example, while shareholder banks have a higher 
capital ratio on average compared to stakeholder banks, the opposite is true when looking 
at the median figures. This implies that a few extreme outliers skew the average results 
in favor of shareholder banks, while the figures of stakeholder banks seem to be more 
closely grouped together. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for all the variables used 
in the panel data analysis, as well as their respective t-statistics. 
 
Tables with the regression results show how the independent variables correlate with each 
performance measure. The figures for each variable include the correlation coefficient, as 
well as their t-statistic in parentheses. The results are shown with the macroeconomic 
variables both included and excluded. Each respective table is divided into three columns: 
one for all the bank data with the stakeholder dummy included, and one for the individual 
determinants for both stakeholder banks and stakeholder banks. The bottom of the table 
shows the R-squared, as well as the individual fixed effects used for each column. Table 
4 and 5 show the fixed panel data regression results for profitability measured by ROAA 
during and after the crisis, respectively. A positive correlation between an independent 
variable and ROAA indicates that the variable in question is a determinant for increased 
profitability for banks included in the data. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix for the variables used. 
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Table 4. Fixed effects panel data regression results for profitability during the financial crisis. 
 
 
From the first and fourth column in table 4, we can observe the determinants of 
profitability for all Nordic banks during the financial crisis. The column shows that, at 
10% confidence level, stakeholder banks had a statistically significant positive correlation 
with profitability. This means that on average, stakeholder banks were more profitable 
than shareholder banks during the financial crisis. In this data series, also firm size and 
capital ratio correlated positively with profitability, so bigger and well capitalized banks 
performed better during the crisis. These findings make sense, since banks with such 
qualities can be considered more stable during financial uncertainty, and thus have a 
competitive advantage over smaller banks with lower levels of capitalization. Bigger 
banks also benefit from the “too-big-to-fail” assumption during crisis periods, which they 
can exploit to their benefit. Liquidity had a negative correlation with profitability, 
meaning that banks with less liquid assets had better profitability. Lower levels of 
ROAA
Stakeholder Dummy
0,154*
(1,766)
- -
0,159*
(1,817)
- -
Size
0,039**
(1,985)
-0,188
(-0,653)
-0,771
(-1,479)
0,039**
(1,981)
-0,164
(-0,578)
-0,779
(-1,523)
Capital ratio
0,045***
(7,963)
-0,019
(-0,703)
-0,030
(-0,911)
0,044***
(7,918)
-0,025
(-0,904)
-0,030
(-0,908)
Share of loans
0,002
(0,714)
0,012*
(1,923)
-0,012
(-1,071)
0,001
(0,667)
0,009
(1,441)
-0,011
(-1,044)
Share of non-interest 
income
0,000
(0,293)
0,000
(0,836)
0,001*
(1,890)
0,000
(0,286)
0,000
(0,940)
0,001*
(1,881)
Liquidity
-0,004**
(-2,395)
0,002
(0,733)
0,000
(0,0535)
-0,004**
(-2,379)
0,002
(0,675)
0,001
(0,116)
GDP Growth
-0,039*
(-1,792)
-0,040**
(-2,579)
-0,006
(-0,144)
- - -
Bank fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes No No Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels: * = p < 10% ; ** = p < 5% ; *** = p < 1%.
R-squared 0,185 0,625 0,768
All banks
Shareholder 
banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Constant
-0,620*
(-1,946)
1,169
(0,499)
8,565
(1,570)
# of observations 1092 717 375
121232353# of banks
Shareholder 
banks
353 232 121
All banks
375
0,185 0,618 0,768
-0,315
(-1,103)
1,527
(0,657)
8,662
(1,628)
- -Inflation rate
0,067
(1,490)
0,066*
(1,927)
0,036
(0,383)
-
1092 717
Stakeholder 
banks
2009-2012
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liquidity means more productivity as well as more operational risk for banks, as more of 
their assets are put to productive use and less is used as a buffer to shield from potential 
liquidity issues. Nordic banks also seemed to act countercyclically during the crisis, as 
GDP growth correlated negatively with profitability. 
 
When looking at the individual statistics for both stakeholder and shareholder banks, the 
significant correlation coefficients observed in the first column do not apply. For 
stakeholder banks, the only significant internal determinant for profitability seems to be 
their share of loans to total assets. This would suggest that stakeholder banks that focused 
more on lending were able to outperform other banks during the crisis. Loans can be 
considered to provide stable returns during financial turmoil, as long as the bank’s 
customers are able to manage their payments. Stakeholder bank profitability was also 
negatively correlated with GDP growth, suggesting that the assumption made by Ferri et. 
al. (2014) of stakeholder bank countercyclicality during financial downturns is true. 
Inflation rate also correlated positively with stakeholder bank profitability, which can be 
a sign of stakeholder banks being able to forecast inflation fluctuations, and adjust their 
operations accordingly. For shareholder banks, the only statistically significant 
profitability determinant was their share of non-interest income. This finding is relatively 
surprising, given the dysfunctionality in the financial markets during the crisis, and that 
non-interest income can be considered a supplementary form of income for banks. On the 
other hand, as interest rates dropped drastically during the crisis, banks were forced to 
find other sources of income from non-interest yielding sources, which could explain the 
positive correlation. The lack of statistically significant variables in both samples can be 
a sign of heterogeneosity within both groups, implying that the Nordic stakeholder and 
shareholder banking sectors are very diverse regarding their financial operations. 
 
Table 5 shows the same data as table 4, but for the time period after the crisis. The first 
noteworthy observation in the column including all banks is that while stakeholder banks 
still seem to outperform shareholder banks, the results are not statistically significant for 
the post-crisis period. The development is expected, since shareholder banks are 
commonly expected to outperform stakeholder banks during normal economic 
conditions. Post-crisis profitability is instead driven by the size, capitalization, and share 
of loans. GDP growth has a negative coefficient, suggesting that the countercyclicality 
has continued even after the crisis, either deliberately or incidentally. Inflation rate also 
correlates negatively with profitability, which indicates that banks have not been able to 
forecast the changes in their economic environment too well. All in all, recent years have 
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seemed to have favored large Nordic banks that are well capitalized and focus more on 
traditional banking activities, at least from the perspective of profitability.  
 
Table 5. Fixed effects panel data regression results for profitability after the financial crisis. 
 
 
Interestingly, both size and capital ratio actually correlate negatively with profitability for 
both groups, unlike in the results for the entire dataset. Thus, smaller and more leveraged 
stakeholder and shareholder banks seem to have benefitted the most profit-wise after the 
crisis in their own ownership groups. While they might lack the benefits of large banks. 
smaller banks may be able to adjust to new market conditions more flexibly compared 
their bigger counterparts. It is also somewhat easier for them to produce higher returns 
relative to their size compared to larger banks. Being more leveraged allows banks to use 
borrowed money to invest and turn into profits, while increasing their risk level in the 
process, so the negative correlation between capital ratio and profitability is 
ROAA
Stakeholder Dummy
0,030
(0,478)
- -
0,028
(0,438)
- -
Size
0,047***
(3,157)
-0,998***
(-3,853)
-0,896***
(-3,390)
0,048***
(3,204)
-1,025***
(-3,976)
-0,898***
(-3,409)
Capital ratio
0,026***
(5,895)
-0,163***
(7,583)
-0,031**
(-2,117)
0,026***
(5,783)
-0,171***
(-8,359)
-0,032**
(-2,188)
Share of loans
0,003*
(1,805)
0,032***
(4,321)
0,006
(0,803)
0,003*
(1,839)
0,033***
(4,467)
0,005
(0,702)
Share of non-interest 
income
0,000
(1,102)
-0,000
(-0,208)
0,000
(0,773)
0,000
(1,214)
-0,000
(-0,151)
0,000
(0,673)
Liquidity
0,0000
(0,118)
0,006**
(2,286)
-0,010**
(-1,975)
0,000
(0,147)
0,006**
(2,332)
-0,010**
(-2,093)
GDP Growth
-0,133***
(-3,689)
-0,047
(-1,372)
0,042
(0,593)
- - -
Bank fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes No No Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels: * = p < 10% ; ** = p < 5% ; *** = p < 1%.
7,728***
(3,789)
9,719***
(3,433)
2013-2017
453 326 127
1777 1252 525
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Shareholder 
banks
0,076 0,462 0,717
Inflation rate
-0,102**
(-2,034)
-0,047
(-1,010)
-0,101
(-1,264)
- - -
0,492 0,719
-0,243
(-1,048)
7,587***
(3,707)
9,695***
(3,421)
# of banks
# of observations 1777 1252 525
-0,285
(-1,230)
R-squared
Constant
Shareholder 
banks
Stakeholder 
banks
All banks
127326453
0,083
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understandable during economic growth. While shareholder banks have a negative 
correlation between liquidity and profitability, the opposite is true for stakeholder banks. 
This is a surprising finding, since excess liquidity means that assets are not being handled 
effectively. One explanation for this finding could be that high liquidity provides stability, 
which in turn allows banks to operate more efficiently. Loan share was also a positive 
profitability indicator for stakeholder banks, indicating that stakeholder banks that have 
focused more on lending operations have been able to outperform their contemporaries. 
Moreover, the loan share variable is significant and positively correlated with profitability 
in both time periods for stakeholder banks, suggesting that stakeholder banks are more 
profitable when focusing on core banking operations, regardless of the economic 
conditions. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 provide the same statistics as the previous two tables, but with a different 
dependent variable. Instead of profitability, the next two tables will focus on the cost 
efficiency of banks. As already stated in the previous chapter, bank cost efficiency is 
measured by the cost-to-income ratio. A smaller ratio indicates that a bank is being run 
more efficiently, so in this context all variables that correlate negatively with cost 
efficiency can be considered to increase cost efficiency. 
 
Table 6 shows the correlation between the independent variables and cost efficiency of 
Nordic banks during the financial crisis period. The first noticeable aspect of the results 
is that the stakeholder dummy variable has a statistically significant negative correlation 
with cost efficiency. This result indicates that stakeholder banks were more cost efficient 
during the financial crisis than shareholder banks. One explanation for this finding could 
be that stakeholder banks were able to adjust to the changes in the market conditions more 
swiftly compared to shareholder banks. Since the ratio ratio is also tied to the income 
level of banks, better cost efficiency can also indicate that stakeholder banks had less 
risky investment positions than shareholder banks during the crisis. Besides the 
ownership type, cost efficiency also seems to be driven by bank size and loan shares of 
total assets. Larger banks were able to operate more efficiently during the crisis than 
smaller banks, which can be attributed to having more stability when facing adverse 
situations. The fairly low number of non-performing loans in the Nordic countries during 
the crisis can be one explanation as to why loan shares correlated positively with cost 
efficiency. 
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Table 6. Fixed effects panel data regression results for cost efficiency during the financial crisis. 
 
 
For shareholder banks, the determinants of cost efficiency continue a similar story to what 
was observed in table 4. None of the independent variables had any statistically 
significant correlation with cost efficiency during the financial crisis, further validating 
the theory of heterogeneosity between Nordic shareholder banks during the crisis period. 
The determinants for stakeholder banks correlate for the most part with what was found 
in the regression with all banks. Bank size and share of loans coefficients were found to 
be negatively correlated with the cost-to-income ratio, suggesting that specifically 
stakeholder banks were driving the results for the entire dataset. Capital ratio also had a 
negative correlation with the cost-to-income ratio, which makes sense since better 
capitalization reduces the costs originating from excessive amounts of loans. Highly 
leveraged companies were also extremely exposed to the adverse market conditions 
during the crisis, making them more susceptible to unexpected losses. GDP growth is 
found to have a negative correlation with cost efficiency, while inflation rate and cost 
COST-TO-INCOME 
RATIO
Stakeholder Dummy
-10,008**
(-2,171)
- -
-10,144**
(-2,201)
- -
Size
-3,838***
(-3,701)
-6,304*
(-1,714)
5,648
(0,444)
-3,834***
(-3,698)
-8,154**
(-2,066)
4,064
(0,325)
Capital ratio
0,332
(1,118)
-0,703**
(-2,022)
0,890
(1,103)
0,338
(1,140)
-0,473
(-1,246)
0,870
(1,081)
Share of loans
-0,454***
(-4,082)
-0,274***
(-3,316)
-0,120
(-0,451)
-0,451***
(-4,053)
-0,131
(-1,477)
-0,131
(-0,498)
Share of non-interest 
income
-0,021
(-1,035)
0,007
(1,363)
0,0153
(1,124)
-0,021
(-1,030)
0,006
(1,059)
0,016
(1,153)
Liquidity
0,096
(1,093)
0,006
(0,195)
0,028
(0,203)
0,096
(1,089)
0,015
(0,472)
0,013
(0,098)
GDP Growth
1,203
(1,053)
1,542***
(7,855)
-0,607
(-0,600)
- - -
Bank fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes No No Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels: * = p < 10% ; ** = p < 5% ; *** = p < 1%.
1093 717 376
0,072 0,815 0,960
- - -
120,568***
(8,022)
136,535***
(4,229)
25,552
(0,197)
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Shareholder 
banks
353 232 121
# of observations 1093 717 376
232353# of banks 121
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Shareholder 
banks
2009-2012
0,9600,074 0,847R-squared
Inflation rate
-2,218
(-0,935)
-3,134***
(-7,211)
-1,379
(-0,611)
Constant
130,328***
(7,741)
145,715***
(4,868)
6,713
(0,050)
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efficiency correlate positively. This may indicate that the cost structures of stakeholder 
banks are heavily influenced by macroeconomic conditions. When the macroeconomic 
variables are excluded from the regression, the significant coefficients (excluding size) 
lose their statistical significance. This can be a sign that the observed findings are not 
robust.  
 
Table 7 illustrates the regression results for determinants of cost efficiency after the 
financial crisis. The first column displays similar results as table 6, but with a similar 
caveat to the determinants of profitability: while other coefficients remain relatively the 
same, the stakeholder dummy coefficient loses its statistical significance. This finding 
also supports the theory of stakeholder banks being able to outperform shareholder banks 
during financial downturns, but not during normal economic conditions. It also amplifies 
the argument that stakeholder banks, unlike shareholder banks, act countercyclically and 
thus help soften the financial impact of recessions. For the rest of the independent 
variables, the size and loan share coefficients correlated positively with cost efficiency, 
just like during the crisis period. The only difference is that the coefficient for size has 
grown, while for share of loans the coefficient has gotten smaller. This result indicates 
that during normal economic conditions, the cost efficiency of Nordic banks is driven 
more by bank size than their loans shares to total assets compared to financial downturns. 
 
For the individual ownership groups, the findings in table 6 are two-fold. For shareholder 
banks, the post-crisis regression results for cost efficiency provide clear robust results. 
Capital ratio is found to have a negative correlation with cost efficiency. More leveraged 
banks may have been able to find cheap debt financing from the financial markets during 
the aftermath of the crisis, which could explain why well capitalized banks haven’t been 
as cost efficient during the post-crisis period. Non-interest income share also correlates 
negatively with cost efficiency, suggesting that providing more exotic banking services 
has been cost intensive for shareholder banks after the crisis. For stakeholder banks, the 
results are similar to the crisis period. Size and capital ratio are found to have a positive 
correlation with cost efficiency when macroeconomic variables are included. GDP 
growth and inflation rate are also statistically significant, both with a negative correlation 
respective to cost efficiency. When macroeconomic variables are excluded, both size and 
capital ratio lose their statistical significance. This would again lead to assume that the 
findings for stakeholder banks are not statistically robust, and/or that macroeconomic 
conditions are key determinants in stakeholder cost efficiency. In the regression without 
macroeconomic variables, share of loans is found to have a positive cost efficiency 
correlation for stakeholder banks. 
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Table 7. Fixed effects panel data regression results for cost efficiency after the financial crisis. 
 
 
Finally, bank riskiness during and after the financial crisis is examined in tables 8 and 9. 
In these regressions, the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans is used to measure bank 
riskiness, as loan loss provisions most accurately portray how much at-risk banks expect 
to be currently holding in their loan portfolio. As with cost efficiency, negative coefficient 
correlation indicates that an increase in the value of the variable in question contributes 
to a bank being less risky. 
 
Table 8 shows the regression results for Nordic bank riskiness during the financial crisis. 
While the coefficient for the stakeholder dummy variable would indicate that stakeholder 
banks have booked less loan loss provisions during the crisis compared to shareholder 
banks, the result is not statistically significant. Thus, it cannot be deduced that stakeholder 
banks would have been able to use relationship banking to their advantage during the 
financial crisis. One explanation for this finding is that a bank can book loan loss 
COST-TO-INCOME 
RATIO
Stakeholder Dummy
-0,065
(-0,016)
- -
-0,057
(-0,014)
- -
Size
-5,942***
(-6,239)
-8,692**
(-2,356)
-7,401
(-0,206)
-5,950***
(-6,250)
-6,121
(-1,616)
-7,082
(-0,199)
Capital ratio
-0,000
(-0,000)
-0,916***
(-2,988)
3,613*
(1,812)
0,003
(0,012)
-0,215
(-0,715)
3,602*
(1,817)
Share of loans
-0,266**
(-2,414)
-0,162
(-1,539)
-0,020
(-0,019)
-0,267**
(-2,422)
-0,248**
(-2,304)
-0,031
(-0,030)
Share of non-interest 
income
-0,001
(-0,051)
-0,006
(-0,982)
0,166***
(4,453)
-0,001
(-0,078)
-0,007
(-1,153)
0,165***
(4,456)
Liquidity
0,055
(0,600)
-0,008
(-0,209)
-0,295
(-0,450)
0,055
(0,593)
-0,015
(-0,389)
-0,311
(-0,477)
GDP Growth
1,685
(0,728)
3,785***
(7,839)
1,904
(0,197)
- - -
Bank fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes No No Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels: * = p < 10% ; ** = p < 5% ; *** = p < 1%.
1777 1252 525
0,050 0,772 0,306
117,476***
(7,944)
123,833***
(4,132)
103,489
(0,270)
- - -
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Shareholder 
banks
453 326 127
2013-2017
# of observations 1777 1252 525
Shareholder 
banks
# of banks 453 326 127
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
R-squared 0,050 0,787 0,307
Constant
116,544***
(7,843)
138,966***
(4,769)
105,485
(0,274)
Inflation rate
2,201
(0,683)
2,160***
(3,258)
-1,643
(-0,151)
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provisions however they please. Since the provision bookings have a negative effect on a 
bank’s profitability, shareholder banks may be more reluctant to make excessive bookings 
onto their accounts. Stakeholder banks do not have a similar issue, since they do not have 
to focus solely on profit maximization. Nordic bank riskiness during the financial crisis 
seems to be driven by the size and liquidity of banks. On average, larger banks booked 
less loan loss provisions relative to their total loan portfolio compared to smaller ones. 
Small banks might have geographical restrictions concerning their operations, which in 
turns limits their ability to regionally diversify their loan portfolios. Similarly, banks with 
more liquidity seemed to be more risky, a result for which there is no clear or precedented 
explanation. 
 
Table 8. Fixed effects panel data regression results for loan quality during the financial crisis. 
 
 
When divided into the two ownership groups, both stakeholder and shareholder banks 
indicate similar results for the crisis period. For both ownership groups, the share of non-
LOAN LOSS 
PROVISIONS
Stakeholder Dummy
-0,153
(-1,176)
- -
-0,150
(-1,157)
- -
Size
-0,047*
(-1,651)
0,473
(1,142)
0,358
(0,483)
-0,047*
(-1,649)
0,453
(1,111)
0,372
(0,508)
Capital ratio
0,007
(0,734)
0,037
(1,067)
-0,034
(-0,785)
0,007
(0,709)
0,032
(0,915)
-0,034
(-0,784)
Share of loans
-0,001
(-0,550)
0,008
(0,947)
0,018
(1,297)
-0,002
(-0,547)
0,005
(0,661)
0,018
(1,288)
Share of non-interest 
income
-0,001
(-1,532)
-0,001**
(-2,137)
-0,002***
(-2,878)
-0,001
(-1,439)
-0,001**
(-1,972)
-0,002***
(-2,891)
Liquidity
0,005**
(2,028)
-0,003
(-1,120)
0,002
(0,305
0,005**
(2,105)
-0,003
(-1,068)
0,002
(0,275)
GDP Growth
-0,041
(-1,288)
-0,047**
(-2,376)
0,010
(0,170)
- - -
Bank fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes No No Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels: * = p < 10% ; ** = p < 5% ; *** = p < 1%.
2009-2012
Inflation rate
-0,015
(-0,221)
0,035
(0,787)
-0,025
(-0,202)
- - -
1051 709 342
0,309
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Shareholder 
banks
340 230 110
1051 709 342
R-squared 0,31 0,787 0,840 0,785 0,840
1,233***
(2,903)
-3,296
(-0,990)
-2,686
(-0,351)
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Shareholder 
banks
Constant
1,036**
(2,172)
-3,910
(-1,163)
-2,495
(-0,321)
# of banks
# of observations
340 230 110
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interest income correlates negatively with the loan loss provision ratio. Banks that focus 
more of their operations towards non-traditional banking activities limit their lending 
operations as a trade-off. This enables them to choose their customers more rigorously. 
One could also argue that in limiting lending operations banks also restrict their expertise 
on the matter, but this does not seem to have an effect on the number of bad loans they 
might have. Additionally, GDP growth correlates negatively with stakeholder bank 
riskiness. Since the customer’s ability to pay its loan commmitments to the bank can be 
related to the current macroeconomic conditions, the correlation can be somewhat 
expected. 
 
Table 9 presents the regression results for the determinants of Nordic bank riskiness after 
the financial crisis. For the post-crisis period, the stakeholder bank dummy is statistically 
significant and negatively correlated, meaning that stakeholder banks have been taking 
less risks in their lending operations than shareholder banks during the time period. While 
the overall assumption originally was that stakeholder banks are less risky than 
shareholder banks, the fact that this result is not found during the crisis period is peculiar. 
One possible explanation could be that in the aftermath of the financial crisis, stakeholder 
banks may have been more tentative with their lending, which could explain the statistical 
significance in the second time period. Besides the stakeholder dummy, size is negatively 
correlated with bank lending risk also after the crisis. Regardless of the economic 
conditions, it would seem that larger banks are able to avoid risks arising from their 
lending activities more effectively than their smaller counterparts. 
 
Regarding the individual determinants for stakeholder and shareholder banks, there are 
some interesting findings, that are difficult to explain. For stakeholder banks, capital ratio 
is statistically significant and correlates negatively with the ratio of loan loss provisions. 
A higher capital ratio may be an indication of a bank’s tendencies regarding risk-taking 
(or the lack thereof), which would provide an internal explanation for the correlation. An 
external explanation could be that highly regarded customers who might receive multiple 
loan offers from different banks may favor banks that are better capitalized to ensure more 
stable conditions. More interestingly, GDP growth is found to be positively correlated 
with the ratio of loan loss provisions for stakeholder banks. This is an unexpected result, 
since by all accounts GDP growth should not increase the amount of bad loans in the 
market. For shareholder banks, the only statistically significant coefficient is liquidity, 
which correlates positively with the ratio of loan loss provisions. As it was with GDP 
growth, this correlation is also unexpected and difficult to explain. There is no apparent 
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reason as to why increased bank liquidity should increase the amount of bad loans a bank 
holds in their loan portfolio. 
 
Table 9. Fixed effects panel data regression results for loan quality after the financial crisis. 
 
 
To summarize, stakeholder banks managed to be more profitable and cost efficient than 
shareholder banks during the financial crisis period. After the crisis period, the results 
were no longer significant. These findings are in line with what has been stated in 
previous studies and what was predicted by the research hypotheses beforehand. These 
results further demonstrate the role of stakeholder banks as countercyclical institutions 
that act to soften the blow of economic downturns. Regarding loan quality, stakeholder 
banks had better quality of loans after the crisis, but not during the crisis period. As the 
initial hypothesis was that stakeholder banks would have better loan quality than 
shareholder banks due to relationship banking, this hypothesis cannot be fully accepted. 
For the individual determinants of stakeholder profitability during and after the crisis, the 
LOAN LOSS 
PROVISIONS
Stakeholder Dummy
-0,392***
(-5,488)
- -
-0,392***
(-5,498)
- -
Size
-0,110***
(-6,626)
0,320
(1,217)
0,414
(0,232)
-0,110***
(-6,628)
0,373
(1,426)
0,415
(1,138)
Capital ratio
-0,006
(-0,978)
-0,102***
(-4,763)
0,022
(0,639)
-0,006
(-1,014)
-0,088***
(-4,367)
0,024
(0,689)
Share of loans
-0,001
(-0,537)
0,010
(1,377)
0,014
(1,468)
-0,001
(-0,547)
0,009
(1,162)
0,015
(1,533)
Share of non-interest 
income
-0,000
(-0,338)
0,000
(0,244)
-0,000
(-0,650)
-0,000
(-0,382)
0,000
(0,180)
-0,000
(-0,563)
Liquidity
0,001
(0,583)
-0,001
(-0,470)
0,014**
(2,200)
0,001
(0,569)
-0,001
(-0,524)
0,014**
(2,278)
GDP Growth
0,029
(0,724)
0,071**
(2,103)
-0,057
(-0,618)
- - -
Bank fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes No No Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels: * = p < 10% ; ** = p < 5% ; *** = p < 1%.
-4,708
(-1,196)
1,556***
(6,033)
-1,782
(-0,860)
-4,756
(-1,210)
1722 1229 493
0,208 0,626 0,686
- - -
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Shareholder 
banks
444 323 121
0,6870,6280,209R-squared
2013-2017
Inflation rate
0,087
(1,562)
0,043
(0,948)
0,075
(0,715)
Constant
1,516***
(5,848)
-1,465
(-0,705)
# of banks 444 323 121
49312291722# of observations
All banks
Stakeholder 
banks
Shareholder 
banks
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statistically significant variables changed for all the performance measures from the crisis 
period to the post-crisis period. Either stakeholder banks change their operational 
approach depending on the prevailing economic conditions, or stakeholder banks with 
differing builds and operational focuses outperform others depending on the current 
economic situation.   
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis discusses the importance of stakeholder banks to the Nordic banking sector, 
especially during times of financial uncertainty. The banking sector is heavily linked to 
all the different areas of the real economy through the operations they provide to both 
individuals and business entities. It is thus the benefit of the entire surrounding economic 
system that financial intermediation is operating effectively even during financial crises. 
In ideal conditions, an optimally functioning banking sector can hold the ability to curb 
some of the negative effects caused by a global financial crisis, such as the one we 
experienced in the last decade. Research has found stakeholder banks to be in a pivotal 
position within the banking sector when it comes to preventing the spreading of financial 
crises. 
 
While previous research has for the most part found stakeholder banks to be less 
profitable, more cost inefficient, and more restrained in their business compared to 
shareholder banks during normal economic conditions, their stability and efficiency 
during economic distress is widely accepted. While shareholder banks have been found 
to use riskier business tactics during normal economic conditions in order to maximize 
their profitability, stakeholder banks typically retain from taking part in such endeavors 
to ensure the reliability and stability of their services to their customers, who act as their 
owners simultaneously. This plan becomes exceptionally beneficial for stakeholder banks 
during financial crisis periods. When the business cycle turns from boom to bust, the more 
riskier operations are most likely the ones to turn sour the quickest. While shareholder 
banks are left to suffer from the consequences, stakeholder banks don’t have to adjust to 
the new conditions since their businesses hadn’t been that risky to begin with. Research 
have shown stakeholder banks to increase their lending operations, as well as become 
intergral operators in implementing new monetary policies set in place to help solve the 
crisis, all the while outperforming shareholder banks in the most relevant categories. 
 
This thesis focuses specifically on the performance metrics of Nordic stakeholder banks, 
and how they stacked up against their shareholder counterparts during and after the most 
recent financial crisis. The first group of research hypotheses analyzes the performance 
of Nordic stakeholder banks against Nordic shareholder banks during the financial crisis. 
The regression results found stakeholder banks to be more profitable and more cost 
efficient than shareholder banks during the crisis. These results were expected based on 
previous research on the topic, and thus the first two research hypotheses are accepted. 
The third performance metric, loan quality, was found not to be statistically significant 
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between stakeholder and shareholder banks. While the result was unexpected, it may have 
a simple explanation. Since shareholder banks aim to maximize their profits, they are 
inherently more hesitant towards making excessive loan loss provision bookings on their 
accounts since it would have a negative effect on their profitability. Simultaneously, 
stakeholder banks do not have a similar obligations toward their owners, so they can focus 
more on providing the most accurate depiction of their financial situation, even if it would 
mean booking more loan loss provisions than they would actually need to. Thus, even 
though the research hypothesis is rejected, the result does not directly imply that 
stakeholder banks didn’t have better loan quality during the financial crisis. 
 
The second set of research hypotheses focused on the same differences in performance 
metrics between Nordic stakeholder and shareholder banks after the financial crisis. The 
results imply that while stakeholder banks were found to have better loan quality during 
the post-crisis period as expected, shareholder banks were unably to outperform 
stakeholder banks in terms of profitability or cost efficiency. Instead, bank size, 
capitalization, and a high loan share were more important performance factors after the 
crisis. The financial crisis and the euro crisis that followed it had long-lasting effects on 
the European economy and in the Nordic countries. It would seem that shareholder banks 
have not been able to exploit the post-crisis markets due to the high factor of uncertainty 
long after the peak of the crisis had been over. Another explanation could be that 
stakeholder banks have simply been able to match the performance of shareholder banks 
during the post-crisis period, and that any advantage shareholder banks may have had 
over stakeholder banks before the crisis started have now disappeared due to the new 
regulations and policies that have been set in place. 
 
The third set of research hypotheses address the determinants of Nordic stakeholder 
banks, and how they differ between time periods as well as those of Nordic shareholder 
banks. For the comparison of stakeholder bank performance determinants during and after 
the financial crisis, the statistically significant determinants for profitability and loan 
quality changed between the two periods. For cost efficiency the determinants stayed 
more or less the same, as bank size and capital ratio were the two main drivers for efficient 
performance regradless of the economic situation. Regarding the differences in 
determinants between the two groups of banks, they seemed to have similar performance 
drivers only when measuring loan quality during the financial crisis, and profitability after 
the financal crisis. The second result is particularly interesting, as it implies that banks 
have become more homogenous after the financial crisis regardless of their ownership 
form. This may be the result of increased banking sector regulation after the crisis. On 
  63 
 
the other four regressions, their performance determinants were different from each other. 
The second research hypothesis is thus accepted, as these results further depict the 
differences between stakeholder and shareholder banks in terms of how they conduct their 
businesses. 
 
For future areas of research in the field of Nordic stakeholder bank performance, it would 
definitely be interesting to see how the Nordic stakeholder banks compare to the other 
stakeholder bank clusters around Europe. The stakeholder banks in Germany, Austria, 
Italy or Spain most likely operate in a completely different fashion due to their 
geographical location compared to the Nordic countries, and it would be fascinating to 
see if there are any significant differences to be found. One aspect that could be added to 
this research topic could be the effects of the new banking regulations on Nordic 
stakeholder banks compared to other European stakeholder banking clusters. 
 
For future research within the Nordic banking sector, another intriguing topic would be 
to see what kind of effects the new banking regulations set in place in the EU after the 
crisis have affected the performance of Nordic stakeholder banks, and whether the effects 
are different between stakeholder and shareholder banks in the Nordics. Another area of 
research could be to find out if there are differences in the determinants of performance 
for stakeholder banks before and after the financial crisis, as the financial and economic 
landscapes have changed significantly between these two time periods. This research 
could be extended to examine whether stakeholder banks that performed better during the 
pre-crisis period were able to continue to do so during the post-crisis period. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1. List of banks 
 
Bank Name Country 
St. 
Bank 
Aarhus Lokalbank Denmark No 
Aasen Sparebank Norway Yes 
AB Svensk Exportkredit Sweden No 
Afjord Sparebank Norway Yes 
Aito Saastopankki Oy Finland Yes 
Akaan Seudun Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Aktia Bank Plc Finland No 
Aktia Plc Finland No 
Aktia Real Estate Mortgage 
Bank plc 
Finland No 
Alajarven Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Alastaron Osuuspankin Finland Yes 
Alavieskan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Alavuden Seudun 
Osuuspankin 
Finland Yes 
Alems Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Alm Brand Bank A/S Denmark No 
Andebu Sparebank Norway Yes 
Andelskassen Faelleskassen Denmark Yes 
Andelskassen JAK Ebeltoft Denmark Yes 
Andelskassen JAK Slagelse Denmark Yes 
Andelskassen Oikos Denmark Yes 
Arbejdernes Landsbank Denmark No 
Arendal og Omegns 
Sparekasse 
Norway Yes 
Artjarven Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Ase och Viste harads 
Sparbank 
Sweden Yes 
Askim & Spydeberg 
Sparebank 
Norway Yes 
Askolan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Attmars Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Atvidabergs Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Auran Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Aurland Sparebank Norway Yes 
Aurskog Sparebank Norway Yes 
Avain Saastopankki Finland Yes 
Avanza Bank AB (publ) Sweden No 
Bank DnB Nord AS Denmark No 
Bank Norwegian AS Norway No 
Bank of Aland Plc Finland No 
Bank2 ASA Norway No 
Bankenes Sikringsfond Norway No 
Banque Internationale a 
Luxembourg Bank 
Danmark A/S 
Denmark No 
Basisbank AS Denmark No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Berg Sparebank Norway Yes 
Bergslagens Sparbanken 
AB 
Sweden Yes 
Birkenes Sparebank Norway Yes 
Bjugn Sparebank Norway Yes 
Bjursas Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Blaker Sparebank Norway Yes 
Bluestep Bank AB (publ) Sweden No 
BN Bank Norway No 
BN Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Boddum-Ydby Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Bolig- og Naeringskreditt 
AS 
Norway No 
Bonum Bank Limited Finland No 
Borbjerg Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
BRFkredit Bank Denmark No 
Bustadkreditt Sogn og 
Fjordane AS 
Norway No 
Carnegie Bank A/S Denmark No 
Central Bank of Savings 
Banks Finland Plc 
Finland Yes 
Cerdo Bankpartner AB Sweden No 
Collector Bank Sweden No 
Coop Bank Denmark No 
Cultura Sparebank Norway Yes 
Dalslands Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Danske Andelskassers Bank Denmark Yes 
Danske Bank AS Denmark No 
Danske Bank PLC Finland No 
Danske Hypotek AB (publ) Sweden No 
Den Jyske Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Deutsche Leasing Sverige 
AB 
Sweden No 
DiBa Bank A/S Denmark No 
Djurslands Bank Denmark No 
DLR Kredit AS Denmark No 
DNB ASA Norway No 
DNB Bank ASA Norway No 
DNB Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Dragsholm Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Drangedal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Dronninglund Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
E.Ohman J:or 
Fondkommission AB 
Sweden No 
Easybank ASA Norway No 
Eidsberg Sparebank Norway Yes 
Eiendomskreditt Norway No 
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Eik Bank Danmark A/S Denmark No 
Eika Grupen AS Norway No 
Eika Kredittbank AS Norway No 
Ekeby Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Ekobanken Medlemsbank Sweden Yes 
Eksportfinans Norway No 
Ekspres Bank A/S Denmark No 
Enon Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Erik Penser Bank AB Sweden No 
Etela-Hameen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Etela-Pohjanmaan 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Etne Sparebank Norway Yes 
Etnedal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Euran Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Evje og Hornnes Sparebank Norway Yes 
Evli Bank Plc. Finland No 
Falkenbergs Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Fana Sparebank Norway Yes 
Fana Sparebank 
Boligkreditt AS 
Norway Yes 
Fanefjord Sparkasse Denmark Yes 
Fano Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Faster Andelskasse Denmark Yes 
FIH Erhvervsbank A/S Denmark No 
FIM Corporation Finland No 
Finansbanken AS Denmark No 
Finnish Fund for Industrial 
Cooperation Ltd 
Finland No 
Finnvera Finland No 
Fjaler Sparebank Norway Yes 
Fjordbank Mors A/S Denmark No 
Flekkefjord Sparebank Norway Yes 
Flemlose Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Foerstaedernes Bank Denmark No 
Folke Sparekassen Denmark Yes 
Folkefinans AS Norway No 
Forex Bank AB Sweden No 
Fornebu Sparebank Norway Yes 
Fortis Commercial Finance 
A/S 
Denmark No 
Frorup Andelskasse Denmark Yes 
Fros Sparkasse Denmark Yes 
Froslev-Mollerup 
Sparekasse 
Denmark Yes 
Fryksdalens Sparban Sweden Yes 
FS Finans III A/S Denmark No 
FS Finans IV A/S Denmark No 
Fynske Bank A/S Denmark No 
GE Money Bank AB Sweden No 
Gildeskal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Gjensidige Bank ASA Norway No 
Grong Sparebank Norway Yes 
Grue Sparebank Norway Yes 
Halden Sparebank Norway Yes 
Hals Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Halsinglands Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Haltdalen Sparebank Norway Yes 
Handelsbanken Finans AB 
(publ) 
Sweden No 
Haradssparbanken 
Monsteras 
Sweden No 
Harstad Sparebank Norway Yes 
Haugesund Sparebank Norway Yes 
Hegra Sparebank Norway Yes 
Helgeland Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Helgeland Sparebank Norway Yes 
Helgenaes Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Helmi Saastopankki Oy Finland Yes 
Helsinki Area Cooperative 
Bank 
Finland Yes 
Hjartdal og Gransherad Spb Norway Yes 
Hjelmeland Sparebank Norway Yes 
Hogsby Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Hoist Finance AB Sweden No 
Hoist Kredit AB Sweden No 
Hol Sparebank Norway Yes 
Holand & Setskog 
Sparebank 
Norway Yes 
Holla og Lunde Sparebank Norway Yes 
Honefoss Sparebank Norway Yes 
Honkajoen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Honkilahden Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Huittisten Saastopankki Finland Yes 
Humppilan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Hunstrup-Osterild 
Sparekasse 
Denmark Yes 
Hvidbjerg Bank AS Denmark No 
ICA Banken AB Sweden No 
IFU Denmark No 
Ikano Bank AB (publ) Sweden No 
Indre Sogn Sparebank Norway Yes 
Ita-Uudenmaan 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Ivetofta Sparbank i 
Bromolla 
Sweden Yes 
J.A.K. Andelskassen 
Ostervra 
Denmark Yes 
Jæren Sparebank Norway Yes 
JAK Medlemsbank Sweden Yes 
Jamsan Seudun 
Osuuspankkic 
Finland Yes 
Janakkalan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Jarvi-Hameen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Jernbanepersonalets 
Sparebank 
Norway Yes 
Jokioisten Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Jutlander Bank A/S Denmark No 
Jyske Bank A/S Denmark No 
Jyske Realkredit A/S Denmark No 
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Kainuun Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kalajoen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kalkkisten Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kangasalan Seudun 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Kangasniemen 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Kannuksen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Karkolan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kaylan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kemin Seudun 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Kerimaen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kesalahden Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Keski-Pohjanmaan 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Keski-Suomen 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Keski-Uudenmaan 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Kihnion Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kiihtelysvaaran 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Kinda-Ydre Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Kiteen Seudun 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Klaebu Sparebank Norway Yes 
Klarna Bank AB (publ) Sweden No 
Klepp Sparebank Norway Yes 
Klim Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
KLP Banken AS Group Norway No 
KLP Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
KLP Kommunekreditt AS Norway No 
KLP Kreditt AS Norway No 
Kobenhavns Andelskasse Denmark Yes 
Kommunalbanken AS Norway No 
Kommunekredit Denmark No 
Kommuninvest i Sverige 
AB 
Sweden No 
Kongsted Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Konneveden Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Korpilahden Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Korsnas Andelsbank Finland Yes 
Koylion Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kragero Sparebank Norway Yes 
Kreditbanken A/S Denmark No 
Kredittforeningen for 
Sparebanker 
Norway Yes 
Kuhmon Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kuortaneen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kurun Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Kvevlax Sparbank Finland Yes 
Kvinesdal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Kyron Seudun Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lægernes Bank A/S Denmark No 
Laholms Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Laihian Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lan & Spar Bank Denmark Yes 
Landbrugets 
Finansieringsbank A/S 
Denmark No 
LandKreditt Bank AS Norway No 
Landkreditt Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Landkreditt SA Norway No 
Landsbanki Foroya Denmark No 
Landshypotek Bank AB Sweden No 
Landshypotek ekonomisk 
forening 
Sweden No 
Langa Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Lanneveden Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lansforsakringar Bank AB Sweden No 
Lansforsakringar Hypotek 
AB 
Sweden No 
Lansi-Kymen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lansi-Suomen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lansi-Uudenmaan 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Lansi-Uudenmaan 
Saastopankki 
Finland Yes 
Lapin Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lapuan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Larvikbanken Brunlanes 
Sparebank 
Norway Yes 
Lavian Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
LeasePlan Norge AS Norway No 
Leasing Fyn & Factoring 
(Denmark) 
Denmark No 
Lehtimaen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lekebergs Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Leksands Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Lemin Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Leppavirran Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Liedon Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Liedon Saastopankki Finland Yes 
Lillesands Sparebank Norway Yes 
Lillestrom Sparebank Norway Yes 
Limingan Osuuspankin Finland Yes 
Liperin Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
LocalTapiola Bank Plc Finland No 
Lofoten Sparebank Norway Yes 
Loimaan Seudun 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Lollands Bank Denmark No 
Lonneberga-Tuna-Vena 
Sparbank 
Sweden Yes 
Lounaismaan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lounaisrannikon 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Lounais-Suomen 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
LR Realkredit A/S Denmark No 
Luhangan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Lunde-Kvong Andelskasse Denmark Yes 
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Luopioisten Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Luster Sparebank Norway Yes 
Luumaen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Maaningan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Mantsalan Osuuspankin Finland Yes 
Marginalen Bank 
Bankaktiebolag 
Sweden No 
Markaryds Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Marker Sparebank Norway Yes 
Marttilan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Max Bank A/S Denmark No 
MedMera Bank AB Sweden No 
Meldal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Melhus Banken Norway No 
Mellilan Seudun 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Merimaskun Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
MERKUR-Den 
Almennyttige Andelskasse 
Denmark Yes 
Metsamaan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Middelfart Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Miehikkalan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Mjobacks Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Modum SpareBank 1 Norway Yes 
Monobank ASA Norway No 
Mons Bank Denmark No 
More Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Morso Bank Denmark No 
Mouhijarven Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Multian Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Municipality Finance PLC Finland No 
Myrskylan Saastopankki Finland Yes 
Nakkila-Luvian 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Nars Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Nesset Sparebank Norway Yes 
Netfonds Bank AS Norway No 
Niinijoen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Nilakan Seudun 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Nivalan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Nooa Savings Bank Ltd Finland Yes 
Nordax Group AB Sweden No 
Nordea Bank Abp Finland No 
Nordea Bank Danmark A/S Denmark No 
Nordea Bank Finland Plc Finland No 
Nordea Bank Norge Norway No 
Nordea Eiendomskreditt AS Norway No 
Nordea Finans Sverige AB 
(publ) 
Sweden No 
Nordea Hypotek AB Sweden No 
Nordea Kredit Denmark No 
Nordea Mortgage Bank Plc Finland No 
Nordfyns Bank Denmark No 
Nordjyske Bank A/S Denmark No 
Nordlandsbanken AS Norway No 
Nordnet AB Sweden No 
Norfund Norway No 
Norrbarke Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Norresundby Bank Denmark No 
Nykredit Bank A/S Denmark No 
Nykredit Realkredit A/S Denmark No 
Obos BBL Norway No 
Obosbanken AS Norway No 
Odal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Ofoten Sparebank Norway Yes 
Olands Bank Sweden No 
Oma Saastopankki Oyj Finland Yes 
OP Cooperative Finland Yes 
OP Corporate Bank Plc Finland Yes 
OP Financial Group Finland Yes 
OP Mortgage Bank Finland Yes 
OP Mynamaki-Nousiainen Finland Yes 
Opdals Sparebank Norway Yes 
OP-Korttiyhtio Oyj Finland Yes 
Orimattilan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Oripaan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Orkla Sparebank Norway Yes 
Orland Sparebank Norway Yes 
Orskog Sparebank Norway Yes 
Orusts Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Ostjydsk Bank Denmark No 
Ostre Agder Sparebank Norway Yes 
Oulaisten Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Oulun Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Outokummun Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Oystre Slidre Sparebank Norway Yes 
Paattisten Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Parikkalan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Pen-Sam Bank A/S Denmark No 
Peraseinajoen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Perhon Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Pielisen Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Pihtiputaan Osuuspankin Finland Yes 
Pohjanmaan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Pohjois-Savon Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Pohjolan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Pop Pankki Finland Yes 
Puolangan Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Pyhaselan 
Paikallisosuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Realkredit Danmark A/S Denmark No 
REISJARVEN 
OSUUSPANKKI 
Finland Yes 
Resurs Bank AB Sweden No 
Rindal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Ringkjobing Landbobank 
A/S 
Denmark No 
Rise Flemlose Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
  73 
 
Roende Savings Bank Denmark Yes 
Romsdal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Rorosbanken Roros 
Sparebank 
Norway Yes 
Roslagens Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Ruoveden Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Ruukin Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Ryslinge Andelskasse Denmark Yes 
Saastopankki Optia (Optia 
Savings Bank) 
Finland Yes 
Sala Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Salling Bank A/S Denmark No 
Sampo Housing Loan Bank 
Plc 
Finland No 
Sandnes Sparebank Norway Yes 
Santander Consumer Bank 
AS 
Norway No 
Savings Banks Group Finland Yes 
Saxo Bank A/S Denmark No 
SBAB Bank AB (publ) Sweden No 
Sbanken ASA Norway No 
Sbanken Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Selbu Sparebank Norway Yes 
Seljord Sparebank Norway Yes 
Setskog Sparebank Norway Yes 
SG Finans AS Norway No 
Sidensjo Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Siilinjärven Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Skagerrak Sparebank Norway Yes 
Skandia Banken Sweden No 
Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken A/S 
Denmark No 
Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken AB 
Sweden No 
Skjern Bank Denmark No 
Skudenes & Aakra 
Sparebank 
Norway Yes 
Skue Sparebank Norway Yes 
Skurups Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Snapphanebygdens 
Sparbank 
Sweden Yes 
Soby Skader Halling Spare 
Og Laanekasse 
Denmark No 
Sodra Dalarnas Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Sodra Hestra Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Sogne og Greipstad 
Sparebank 
Norway Yes 
Soknedal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Solvesborg-Mjallby 
Savings Bank 
Sweden Yes 
Someron Saastopankki Finland Yes 
Sonderha Horsted 
Sparekasse 
Denmark Yes 
Sormlands Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Sp Mortgage Bank Plc Finland No 
S-Pankki Oy Finland No 
Spar Nord Bank Denmark No 
Spar Salling Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Sparbanken 1826  Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Alingsas Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Boken Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Eken AB Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Finn Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Goinge AB Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Gotland Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken i Enkoping Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken i Karlshamn Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Lidkoping Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Nord Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Oresund AB Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Rekarne AB Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Sjuharad AB Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Skaraborg Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Syd Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Tanum Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Tranemo Sweden Yes 
Sparbanken Vastra 
Malardalen 
Sweden Yes 
SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt 
AS 
Norway Yes 
Sparebank 1 BV Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 Gran Norway Yes 
Sparebank 1 Gruppen AS Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 Hallingdal 
Valdres 
Norway Yes 
Sparebank 1 Lom & Skjak Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 
Naeringskreditt AS 
Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 Notteroy-
Tonsberg 
Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 Oslandet Norway Yes 
Sparebank 1 Ostfold 
Akershus 
Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 Ostlandet Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 Ringerike 
Hadeland 
Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 SMN Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 Sore 
Sunnmore 
Norway Yes 
SpareBank 1 SR-Bank Norway Yes 
Sparebank1 Nordvest Norway Yes 
Sparebanken 1 
Gudbrandsdal 
Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Bien Norway Yes 
Sparebanken DIN Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Hardanger Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Hemne Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Jevnaker 
Lunner 
Norway Yes 
Sparebanken More Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Narvik Norway Yes 
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SpareBanken Ost Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Ost 
Boligkreditt AS 
Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Sogn og 
Fjordane 
Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Sor Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Sor Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Sor 
Boligkreditt AS 
Norway Yes 
Sparebanken Vest Norway Yes 
SpareBanken Vest 
Boligkreditt AS 
Norway Yes 
Sparekassen Balling Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Bredebro Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Den Lille 
Bikube 
Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Djursland Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Farso Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen for Norre 
Nebel og Omegn 
Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Fyn A/S Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Hobro Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Hvetbo A/S Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen I Skals Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Kronjylland Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Limfjorden Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Lolland Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Midtdjurs Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Midtjford Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Ostjylland Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Thy Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Vendsyssel Denmark Yes 
Sparekassen Zealand-Fyn 
A/S 
Denmark Yes 
Spareskillingsbanken Norway Yes 
Spydeberg Sparebank Norway Yes 
SR-Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Stadsbygd Sparebank Norway Yes 
Stadshypotek Sweden No 
Storebrand Bank (Formerly 
Finansbanken) 
Norway No 
Storebrand Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Storebrand Group Norway No 
Strommen Sparebank Norway Yes 
SUDUROYAR 
SPARIKASSI 
Denmark Yes 
Sunndal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Suomen 
Hypoteekkiyhdistyksen 
Finland No 
Surnadal Sparebank Norway Yes 
Suur-Savon Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Svea Ekonomi AB Sweden No 
Swedbank AB Sweden No 
Swedbank Mortgage AB Sweden No 
Swedish Ships Mortgage 
Bank 
Sweden No 
Svenska Handelsbanken 
AB 
Sweden No 
Sydbank A/S Denmark No 
Sydbottens Andelsbank Finland Yes 
Terra Kort AS Norway No 
TF Bank AB Sweden No 
Tidaholms Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Tinn Sparebank Norway Yes 
Tjorns Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Tjustbygdens Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Tolga-Os Sparebank Norway Yes 
Tonder Bank Denmark No 
Totalbanken Denmark No 
Totalkredit A/S Denmark No 
Totens Sparebank Norway Yes 
Totens Sparebank 
Boligkreditt AS 
Norway Yes 
Trogstad Sparebank Norway Yes 
Tysnes Sparebank Norway Yes 
Ulricehamns Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Vaara-Karjalan 
Osuuspankki 
Finland Yes 
Vadstena Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Valdemarsviks Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Valdres Sparebank Norway Yes 
Valle Sparebank Norway Yes 
Vang Sparebank Norway Yes 
Varbergs Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Vegarshei Sparebank Norway Yes 
Verd Boligkreditt AS Norway No 
Vestfyns Bank Denmark No 
Vestjysk Bank A/S Denmark No 
Westra Wermlands 
Sparbank 
Sweden Yes 
Vik Sparebank Norway Yes 
Vimmerby Sparbank AB Sweden Yes 
Vinderup Bank Denmark No 
Virserums Sparbank Sweden Yes 
Vistoft Sparekasse Denmark Yes 
Vorbasse Hejnsvig 
Sparekasse 
Denmark Yes 
Vordingborg Bank Denmark No 
Voss Sparebank Norway Yes 
Voss Veksel og 
Landmandsbank 
Norway No 
yA Bank AS Norway No 
Yla-Kainuun Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
Yla-Savon Osuuspankki Finland Yes 
 
